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Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises
D. Daniel Sokol
ABSTRACT
The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate
governance—the governance of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”). There
are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded
corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and
external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for
effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of
undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of
SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE
governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal
firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE
governance across legal origins. In itself, the lack of effective corporate
governance would not be fatal if some of the SOE’s inefficient and
societal-welfare-reducing behavior could be remedied under antitrust
law. However, a review of antitrust decisions on the issue of predatory
pricing by SOEs reveals that antitrust is equally ineffective in its
attempts to monitor SOEs. This Article concludes by identifying a
number of devices to reduce the current inadequacies of both antitrust
and corporate governance of SOEs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning ten years ago, an article by Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (commonly
referred to as “LLSV” even though some subsequent articles have
had a slightly different cast of characters) transformed the debate on
corporate governance by coding at the country level the amount of
investor protection provided under corporate law.1 They found that
1. I would suggest that the transplant effect/legal origin of many systems is not very
clean and changes over time. For example, countries may in certain areas base their company
law on the UK, their trusts and estates law on Germany, and their antitrust law based on the
EU. What then is the legal origin of the country? In other cases, the law on the books does not
reflect law in practice. For example, Argentine antitrust law was modeled on the EU but its
analytical approach for many years followed the U.S. antitrust tradition of the Chicago
School. Germán Coloma, The Argentine Competition Law and Its Enforcement, in LATIN
AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 95–98 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2009). Moreover, in practice I would see some of the U.S. common law approach
incorporated into the fabric of deals involving Latin America, where the origin seemed a hybrid
of the host Latin American country and N.Y. law in part because Latin American practitioners
had spent time in the offices of N.Y. firms like Cleary Gottlieb, Sullivan & Cromwell, and
Shearman & Sterling as well as studied for LLMs in the United States. One practitioner in
Chile told me, “I specialize in Chilean-N.Y. law and in the area of corporate law. I think that
this is the dominant approach in the country.”
LLSV makes certain assumptions about history and political economy in legal origins
that are not supported by the underlying historical record. Holger Spamann, The ‘Antidirector
Rights Index’ Revisited, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming). A number of scholars have attacked
LLSV on these grounds. Nevertheless, LLSV does have an intuitive appeal. In many ways, the
results are what you would expect if you were to individually attempt to rank countries based
on investor protection or other similar features. More importantly, a number of the variables
that LLSV use are a bit squishy, but given the limitations of cross-country quantitative analysis,
this may be the best available approach thus far.
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the level of investor protection of the underlying rules varied
systematically based upon the origin of the legal system. LLSV
concluded that common law jurisdictions were more protective of
outside investors than civil law jurisdictions.2 In a series of papers in
the subsequent decade, the LLSV team extended this initial research
to determine that legal origin had an impact in the area of law and
finance.3 Additional LLSV articles found that legal origins could
explain outcomes in areas as diverse as bank ownership,4 legal
formalism,5 government ownership of media,6 and regulatory
schemes that created barriers to entry.7
Though the LLSV literature addresses a number of important
issues regarding legal origin, corporate governance, government
ownership, and economic growth, LLSV did not ask an important
question—under which legal origin is it most effective to limit
distortions in the economy caused by state-owned enterprises
(“SOEs”)? Stated differently, the legal origins literature overlooks a
key area of corporate governance—the governance of SOEs, which
are a significant part of most countries’ economy. The issue of SOEs,
their governance and their impact in the world economy has taken
on a particularly important role as a result of the worldwide
economic crisis. In many countries, nationalization of industries has
From a policy perspective, the key to changing various bottlenecks to economic growth
requires not merely a top-down approach in the change of the legal system, but also a bottomup approach by the users of these legal systems to overcome regulatory distortions. Over time,
the common law/civil law distinction will be seen as a rather false dichotomy. Instead,
countries may end up being ranked based on their ability to respond to local and changing
conditions.
2. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
3. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002); La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer & Vishny, Law and Finance, supra note 2; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopezde-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works
in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
4. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government
Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002).
5. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003).
6. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, & Andrei Shleifer, Who Owns
the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341 (2003).
7. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002).
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either occurred or is at the forefront of policy discussions in areas
such as the financial sector. However, the potential effects of
nationalization, and of increased state control more generally, have
not been fully realized in policy circles.
There are important theoretical differences between SOEs and
publicly-traded corporations. In a number of substantive areas, it is
typically more difficult to effectively monitor SOEs than private
firms. This Article claims that in comparing both internal and
external controls of SOEs, neither common nor civil law legal origin
regimes effectively monitor SOE corporate governance at the same
level as private firms.
Key theoretical insights a half century ago from Alchian and
Stigler suggest that managerial slack is less likely in competitive
industries.8 Competition, therefore, can be a substitute for good
corporate governance. Empirical work suggests that the inverse is
also true. In industries that are not competitive, corporate
governance seems to have little impact.9 This is not to suggest that
competition and corporate governance are perfect substitutes.
Indeed, LLSV make such an observation.10 Where there is no
competition within an industry, good corporate governance is less
necessary than in situations where there is robust competition. One
might imagine that because of the imperfect substitutability of
corporate governance and competition policy, jurisdictions may need
only chose one form of regulation to ensure economic gain for
society. However, as this Article will illustrate, neither corporate
governance nor competition law as practiced for SOEs seem
particularly effective as currently constituted.
Good corporate governance may provide firms with an edge over
competitor firms. It may also improve resource availability within the
firm, and “better” corporate governance may lead to improved
performance.11 There are two strands of research on the topic. One
8. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 211 (1950); George J. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L. & ECON. 54 (1958).
9. Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Does Corporate Governance Matter in
Competitive Industries?, 3 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No.
185, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006118.
10. Shliefer & Vishny, supra note 3, at 738 (“While we agree that product market
competition is probably the most powerful force toward economic efficiency in the world, we
are skeptical that it alone can solve the problem of corporate governance.”).
11. René M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 13–15 (1999).
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strand finds that better corporate governance is exogenous (or
generated from outside).12 A second strand suggests that better
corporate governance is endogenous (or produced from within).13
Given the disagreement between the exogenous or endogenous
nature of good governance, there is not clear causation that good
corporate governance leads to better performance. We tend to
believe causation as a matter of faith rather than as a matter of
evidence. This Article assumes that better corporate governance will
improve corporate performance. Given this assumption, important
differences emerge in terms of the incentives and structures of SOEs
and private firms, which lead to dissimilar outcomes in corporate
governance and efficiency.
In itself, the lack of effective corporate governance would not be
fatal if antitrust law remedied some of the SOE anti-competitive
distortions. However, a review of antitrust decisions across
jurisdictions on the issue of predatory pricing by SOEs reveals that
antitrust law is equally ineffective in its attempts to monitor SOE bad
behavior.14 This Article does not suggest that better corporate
governance will necessarily cure the type of anti-competitive behavior
that antitrust remedies. Rather, it makes the point that SOEs, from a
standpoint of efficiency, create problems and that improved
corporate governance or effective competition policy are substitutes
that could lead to more efficient outcomes regarding SOEs.
12. Bernard Black, The Corporate Governance Behavior and Market Value of Russian
Firms, 2 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 89 (2001); Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to
Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461, 1487–89 (2005);
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and
Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 97–98 (1998); Randall Morck, Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 293, 311–14 (1988).
13. Audra L. Boone, Laura Casares Field, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Charu G. Raheja, The
Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis, 85 J. FIN.
ECON. 66 (2007); N.K. Chidambaran, Darius Palia & Yudan Zheng, Does Better Corporate
Governance ‘Cause’ Better Firm Performance? (Whitcomb Ctr. for Research in Fin. Servs.,
working paper series WCRFS: 06–19, 2006), available at http://business.
rutgers.edu/download.aspx?id=1192; John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus,
Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating
Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655 (2006); Harold Demsetz & Belén
Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 209, 211, 230–31
(2001).
14. The tax literature suggests that better corporate governance means that firms are less
likely to engage in aggressive tax strategies. See Nicola Sartori, Corporate Governance Dynamics
and Tax Compliance, 1, 20 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law and Econ., working paper No.
1361895, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1361895.
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Predatory pricing is only one of the anti-competitive behaviors in
which SOEs engage. However, it is an area that illustrates a gap
between how laws generally apply to all firms without taking into
account the different dynamics between private and state ownership.
This Article does not make the claim that good corporate
governance will prevent antitrust violations.15 The linkage between
corporate governance and antitrust is more indirect. Both are
possible legal/regulatory tools to address SOE inefficiencies.16
Because of the inability to obtain quantitative data to determine
the full extent of the costs of SOEs worldwide, this Article employs a
qualitative rather than quantitative research method. In such
circumstances, a case-study approach may be the most effective way
to ground analysis in experience rather than mere theory.17 This
Article uses multiple qualitative case studies to illustrate the impact
of the difficulty of applying corporate governance and antitrust laws
to address anti-competitive behavior by SOEs. Case studies provide
an explanatory theory that has high construct validity and
accommodates complex causal relations. Multiple case studies
provide for more meaningful comparisons across cases and for better
generalizations.18 This Article focuses on the United States
experience in greater detail to better contrast it with both common
and civil law jurisdictions around the world. Furthermore, it
undertakes a study of the postal sector as an SOE industry for three
reasons: (1) a majority of postal providers around the world remain
in state hands, (2) the postal sector is a network industry with
significant competition issues, and (3) there are related services
where there is competition so that the governance and competition
in the postal sector affects a number of critical areas in the economy.
In many countries, government ownership of postal providers has
shielded the postal sector from both effective regulatory and antitrust
review. The historically large role that the postal service has played in
15. But see Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129–31 (Del. 1963)
(involving a now superseded oversight case regarding the potential liability of directors for
losses due to non-compliance with antitrust law).
16. However, antitrust and other violations might be more likely than with bad
corporate governance in which directors are reckless.
17. GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 67 (1994).
18. Christopher H. Achen & Duncan Snidal, Rational Deterrence Theory and
Comparative Case Studies, 41 WORLD POL. 143, 146 (1989). A danger of case studies is the
possibility of selection bias.
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government and the economy accounts for part of the reason it has
been shielded. If postal providers (and their various non-postal
subsidiaries such as insurance, banking, and express delivery service
companies) were to be publicly traded in their country, they would
be among the largest publicly-traded firms in their respective stock
markets based on market capitalization and revenues. In numerous
countries, the postal regulator holds a cabinet-level position.19 The
examination of the regulation of corporate governance and of
competition policy of postal firms supports the larger theoretical
claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance and competition
across legal origins.
Section II provides an analysis of the difference between public
(government) and private (generally publicly listed) ownership in
terms of incentives and mechanisms of control of corporate
governance. Section III provides an understanding of the underlying
economics of the postal sector. Section IV offers a review of
corporate governance of postal SOEs. Section V analyzes the
competition policy in those same countries and analyzes predatory
pricing tests that could limit the potential anti-competitive harm that
SOEs might create. Section VI concludes and offers a series of
recommendations on improved corporate governance and
competition law and policy of SOEs, regardless of the legal origin.
II. PRIVATE VS. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF FIRMS
A. Setting the Stage
SOEs are, as the name suggests, controlled by the state rather
than by private actors. This Article uses the World Bank definition
for an SOE: “government owned or government controlled
economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from
selling goods and services.”20 According to a number of empirical

19. This for a time was also true in the United States, where the Postmaster General was
a cabinet-level position. John C. Panzar, Interactions between Regulatory and Antitrust Policies
in a Liberalized Postal Sector, 2 (Aug. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/research/pdf/Paper_Panzar.pdf.
20. WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 26 (1995) (drawing from Leroy Jones, Public Enterprise and
Economic Development: The Korean Case (1975) (thesis, Harvard Univ.) (on file with Korea
Development Institute)).
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studies, SOEs tend to be less efficient than similar private firms
because of the incentives associated with government ownership.21
SOEs are an important part of global economic activity but
remain under-explored in the academic literature, particularly the
legal literature. Recent empirical work associates SOEs with lower
economic growth in the developing world.22 “[S]potty and relatively
old data” hamper systematic analysis of current trends in SOE
involvement in the economy.23 Nevertheless, recent work by the
World Bank concludes that SOEs play a critical role in the economy,
particularly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.24 SOEs are part of a
larger set of issues regarding state control over the economy. In
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the public sector share
of GDP varies from as little as around twenty percent (Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to as much as eighty percent
(Belarus). Twenty of twenty six transition countries were in the
range of twenty to forty percent of GDP for the state sector share of
GDP.25 These numbers do not reflect changing developments

21. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMICS OF
PRIVATIZATION (2005); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 267–68; Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu,
The Political Economy of Privatization and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the
Telecommunications Sector, 30 J. COMP. ECON. 439 (2002). But see, Daniel F. Spulber,
Discovering the Role of the Firm: The Separation Criterion and Corporate Law, 16 (N.W. Law
& Econ., Research Paper No. 08-23, 2008) (going so far as to refuse to classify SOEs as firms
since there is no separation between the transactional interests of the firm and its owners).
22. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan & Mingming Zhou, Bank Ownership and Efficiency
in China: What Will Happen in the World's Largest Nation?, 1 (Working Paper, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924246.
23. Sunita Kikeri & Aishetu Fatima Kolo, Privatization Trends and Recent
Developments, 15 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3765, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=849344. A World Bank study estimated
that worldwide, SOEs account for between eight to ten percent of GDP in countries that are
classified as either upper-middle-income or industrialized. In low income countries, SOEs
account for a fourteen percent share in GDP. WORLD BANK, supra note 20, at 32–33. There
are problems to the methodology of this report including the selection of certain sectors for
study and the countries picked. See generally Ravi Ramamurti, Why Haven’t Developing
Countries Privatized Deeper and Faster?, 27 WORLD DEV. 137 (1999).
24. Sunita Kikeri & Aishetu Kolo, State Enterprises, WORLD BANK PUB. POL’Y J. 304
(2006), available at http://rru.worldbank.org/PublicPolicyJournal/Summary.aspx?id=304
(noting the prevalence of SOEs around the world); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
222, 261–62 (1999) (noting that SOEs are more common in countries which have a French
civil code or Socialist legal origin).
25. World Bank, ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: AN OED EVALUATION OF WORLD BANK
ASSISTANCE 15 (2004).
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around the world where financial crisis has caused a number of
countries to nationalize some struggling firms.
The prevalence of SOEs around the world and the outcomes of
SOE behavior may cause a resource misallocation in society. As this
Article will discuss in greater detail, government ownership may
facilitate rent-seeking behavior by interest groups to undertake
certain types of state support through regulatory mission creep and
through increased regulatory barriers to entry. Government
ownership adds to inefficiency and increases transaction costs.26 Such
barriers to entry may have a significant negative effect on a country’s
economy given the critical role the private sector plays in a country’s
global competitiveness.27
That SOEs exist at all and that they exist in such large numbers is
perhaps surprising. After all, as recently as 2001, Hansmann and
Kraakman suggested that we had reached the end of history for
corporate law28 because of worldwide convergence based on a
number of factors:
(1) full legal personality, including well-defined authority to bind
the firm to contracts and to bond those contracts with assets that
are the property of the firm, as distinct from the firm’s owners; (2)
limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by
investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board
structure; and (5) transferable shares.29

According to their analysis, there was little appeal to a heavy-handed
state in corporate affairs.30 However, SOEs have not followed the
path toward global convergence in corporate law, even before the
current period of global financial crisis.
In one sense, Hansmann and Kraakman are correct about an end
of history of corporate law. SOEs are outliers. They are less efficient
than private firms. Empirical work suggests that when benchmarked

26. Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AMER.
ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
27. See Ziya Öni, The Logic of the Developmental State, 24 COMP. POL. 109, 124–25
(1991).
28. This is a take-off on Kant’s idea of the end of history and on the best-selling book
from the 1990s, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992)
(arguing that liberal-democracy had won in the marketplace of ideas).
29. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439–40 (2001).
30. Id. at 447.
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against similar private firms, SOEs perform worse.31 Yet, in spite of
the end of history for corporate law as articulated by Hansmann and
Kraakman, we live in a world full of SOEs. In fact, due to the worldwide financial crisis, the number of SOEs around the world seems to
be increasing. Therefore, scholars need to address how to improve
the effectiveness of SOEs.
A series of studies suggest that a relatively modest improvement
in the efficiency of SOEs of five percent in a given country could free
up financial resources of approximately one to five percent of a
country’s GDP.32 Conversely, if an SOE is poorly managed, it can
increase the cost to governments and divert money from other
priorities.
This is not a simple dichotomy. The market does not always send
the right signals and may malfunction. If we assume that the current
financial crisis is merely a blip, then the market is in fact still better
relative to the alternatives. We need to think about alternatives,
specifically about SOEs in sectors that are competitive (or can be)
and that have network effects.33

31. Alvaro Cuervo & Belén Villalonga, Explaining the Variance in the Performance
Effects of Privatization, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 581, 581–83 (2000) (noting that privatized
firms perform better but with variable performance); Florencio López-de-Silanes,
Determinants of Privatization Prices, 112 Q.J. ECON. 965, 967–68 (1997); William L.
Megginson, Robert C. Nash & Matthias van Randenborgh, The Financial and Operating
Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 403,
403–05 (1994); Belén Villalonga, Privatization and Efficiency: Differentiating Ownership
Effects from Political, Organizational, and Dynamic Effects, 42 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 43
(2000) (providing a literature review of 153 studies on privatization).
32. Maria Vagliasindi, Governance Arrangements for State Owned Enterprises, 2 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4542, 2008).
33. Are market-based metrics right for judging SOEs? This question is worthy of a book
of its own. This Article does not address all SOEs. There are some that have important
security, market failure, or altruistic functions. This Article only addresses those SOEs for
which there is a market competition function rather than a market replacement function. The
proposals at the end of the Article are general and need to be contextualized to the specific
situation in a given country based on political, social, and economic factors. This Article does
not address other ways to think about the role of regulation and the limits of market as
opposed to other non-market approaches and the extent to which some SOEs might be seen as
public goods. For this Article, the concern is only for those functions which are also privately
provided and where issues of civics, prestige, and altruism play a marginal role for SOEs as
opposed to other goods and services provided by the state.
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B. Firms Generally
Before identifying the special characteristics of SOEs, let us begin
with a basic overview of the purpose of a firm and of corporate law.
Private firms exist to make a profit. From a contract theory
standpoint, Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that firm owners
contract to maximize wealth.34 Though a number of scholars suggest
that profit making, both as a matter of positive and normative law
does not require profit maximization,35 the profit making component
for firms remains the central component for doing business, even if
not the only motive. To achieve a profit making result, law provides
for the allocation of residual ownership of the corporation to
shareholders.
Corporate law is the body of rules that allow for the creation and
continuation of the corporate form and for profit creation.36
Corporate governance addresses the governance mechanisms of the
firm.37 The first issue that we must address in corporate governance
is definitional—what do we mean by corporate governance? For
purposes of this Article, let us define corporate governance as “the
system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations at a
company.”38 Jean Tirole explains that, from an economics
perspective,
corporate governance relates to the “ways in which the suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on
their investment.” Moreover, [corporate governance] is
preoccupied with ways in which a corporation’s insiders can

34. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1421 (1989).
35. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 738–40 (2005) (arguing that pure profit maximization would reduce quality of
corporate governance because it would override social and moral sanctions); Cynthia A.
Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1632–33 (2006) (suggesting
that human rationality and cognitive behavior allow for a more nuanced understanding of the
process of compliance with law).
36. See D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57
EMORY L.J. 985, 990 (2008).
37. For literature reviews on corporate governance, see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 3;
Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance and
Globalization, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 129 (2004).
38. Stuart L. Gillan, Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview, 12 J.
CORP. FIN. 381, 382 (2006).
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credibly commit to return funds to outside investors and can
thereby attract external financing.39

The traditional problem of corporate governance in the United
States is a vertical problem among shareholders, managers, and
directors.40 In contrast, given more highly concentrated ownership in
the rest of the world, oftentimes the major issue of control is
horizontal among controlling shareholders and outside
shareholders.41
One issue that arises in corporate governance is the problem of
agency costs.42 These costs occur because the separation of
ownership from management creates manager incentives that may be
different from those of shareholders.43 There are sub-principal-agent
situations within a firm at each level of management, and agency
costs can arise at each of these levels.44 Jensen and Meckling created
an agency cost model of delegation of decision-making authority
from the principal to the agent.45 Fama and Jensen suggested that
agency costs could include “structuring, monitoring, and bonding a
set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.”46 In the
corporate setting, the most important agency cost is the cost of
monitoring agents by the principal. These costs are not imposed
merely through direct monitoring. Rather, monitoring costs also
include various mechanisms by the principal “to ‘control’ the
behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation
policies, operating rules, etc.”47 These mechanisms work to align
39. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16 (2006).
40. See Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 371, 372 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2004).
41. See id.
42. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976).
43. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–25 (Macmillan Co. 1939) (1932); Ronald J. Gilson & Charles
K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital
Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231–32 (2008).
44. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42, at 309.
45. Id. at 308–10.
46. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 301, 304 (1983).
47. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42, at 308 n.9. Some think that the emphasis on
agency costs underplays the importance of team production that requires inputs from various
stakeholders. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the
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incentives of the principal and agent to reduce agency costs. Without
such mechanisms to align the incentives between the two groups,
managers may attempt to shirk from their duties or steal from the
corporation.
Shirking is particularly troublesome in the agency context
because it is difficult to prove—it is easier to prove that someone is
stealing rather than shirking (e.g., lack of oversight, care, etc.).48 As
each individual investor has a high cost to monitor to prevent
managerial shirking, it can be quite expensive to monitor a firm for
any particular investor.49 Alchian and Demsetz provide the insight
that the purpose of management is to monitor the various outputs of
agents to deter shirking.50 To prevent managers themselves from
shirking, the shareholder as residual claimant provides oversight over
managers and directors.51
To control agency costs, firms often use a nexus of contracts.52
In the contractual theory of the firm, the firm as a legal entity is
based upon a set of contracts within the common framework of the
Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 403–05 (2001); Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J.
CORP. L. 743, 743–45 (1999).
48. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (arguing that individuals have incentive to
shirk in their duties to the firm); Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1382, 1405–07 (1992) (providing an account for rational agents to
shirk).
49. Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market
Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 46 (2004) (noting that “[t]hrough the expenditure
of costly resources, any single investor may monitor and work to discipline underperforming
managers,” but that any one investor lacks the incentive to provide the optimal level of such
monitoring).
50. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 48, at 781–82.
51. For example, shareholders as owners have the power to approve major transactions
and to replace directors. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1439–40 (2006). According to Bainbridge, such
a solution has a number of shortcomings because it fails to recognize the reality of shareholder
supremacy. As Bainbridge states, “[i]n general, shareholders of public corporations have
neither the legal right, the practical ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control
necessary for meaningful monitoring of the corporation's agents.” Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 568
(2003).
52. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon, What Else Matters for
Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 994–95, 1001–09
(2008); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from
Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1057–59 (1996) (discussing the contractarian model). Note
however that agency costs and the contractarian model are distinct.
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firm.53 The contracts that make up the firm address a number of
issues such as the source of financing, the nature of residual
ownership interests in the firm and the division of responsibilities
with the firm.54 The key insight of the contractual theory of the firm
is that through contracts, a firm can reduce risks and create
incentives for management and employees of a firm.55 Yet, contracts
are not sufficient because of the potential self interest of
management. This is why statutes and equity were needed to set
forth basic principles of corporate governance.
C. SOEs Generally
SOEs are different from privately-owned firms. SOEs are not
necessarily profit maximizers,56 they may have goals that conflict with
those of their de facto owners—the government,57 they do not
necessarily seek to maximize shareholder value,58 and they may be
playing on an unlevel playing field relative to their private
counterparts.59 All of these factors play some role in reducing SOE
efficiency, and limiting the success of SOEs relative to private
corporations.60
SOEs are different from private firms because SOEs are not
necessarily profit-maximizers.61 Some (or in a number of cases, all)
SOE functions may be based on non-financial goals. One potential
problem with state ownership is that it may be used for political

53. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991).
54. R. Richard Geddes, Agency Costs and Governance in the United States Postal Service,
in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE 114, 116 (Gregory J. Sidak ed., 1994).
55. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (Univ. of Chi. Press 1971)
(1921) (addressing how contracting can reduce certain types of risk); Bengt Holmstrom &
Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance & Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense
of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 133–35 (2001) (arguing that incentive-based
compensation serves as an internal governance mechanism); Jensen & Meckling, supra note
42, at 305–10 (arguing the firm is a nexus of contracts).
56. See infra, notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
57. See infra, notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
58. See infra, note 77 and accompanying text.
59. See infra, notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
60. See infra, notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
61. Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1426–27 (2003).
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objectives. Some objectives for SOEs may include employment,62
social goals,63 or capital formation.64 This is not to suggest there are
not some situations in which SOEs should play a role in the
economy.65 The most persuasive defense of state ownership arises
when state ownership overcomes market failure.66 There also may be
a need for intervention for social reasons to redistribute to the very
poor.67 Moreover, SOEs may be desirable if a public good needs to
be provided and if quality is difficult to specify in a contract.68 These
goals, however, for the most part, are not based upon an efficiency
rationale.
Government may have competing goals and SOE management
has to determine which of these goals to follow.69 Moreover,
government interests may not be the same as commercial interests.
As a result of this tension, government may not provide the
necessary oversight function for an SOE. The lack of effective
oversight may result in part from situations in which a number of
different parts of government oversee the SOE.70
Some SOEs may not focus on profit maximization because they
are in regulated industries in which regulators pressure firms to
undertake certain policies with outcomes to benefit politicians rather

62. Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Theory of Privatisation, 106
ECON. J. 309, 309 (1996).
63. Ronald Wintrobe, The Market for Corporate Control and the Market for Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 435, 435–36 (1987).
64. Armando Labra, Public Enterprise in an Underdeveloped and Dependent Economy, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN A MIXED ECONOMY 36, 36–37 (William J. Baumol ed.,
1980).
65. See, e.g., David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information,
and Incentives, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 567, 567 (1987).
66. Paul A. Grout & Margaret Stevens, The Assessment: Financing and Managing Public
Services, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 215, 215 (2003).
67. Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135
(1998) (public ownership may be preferred “in a country [where] good contract enforcement
[is] very limited, and [in] particular cases where soft incentives are extremely valuable and
competition is very limited”).
68. See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private Ownership of
Public Goods, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1343, 1343–45 (2001).
69. Where a sector ministry provides regulatory oversight and another ministry exercises
financial oversight, this may reduce the intra-government conflict of interest.
70. David H. Scott, Strengthening the Governance and Performance of State-Owned
Financial Institutions 7–8 (World Bank Pol’y Research, Working Paper No. 4321, 2007).
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than shareholders.71 Government must balance its role as regulator
with its role as the owner of a firm. Bureaucrats may have an
incentive to protect SOEs from competition when bureaucrats serve
as both regulators and market participants. Bureaucrats also have an
incentive to increase the size of bureaucracy (such as an SOE)
because the increased size and scope of a bureaucracy provides them
with greater prestige and the ability to advance their careers.72
The lack of an efficiency rationale changes the incentives for an
SOE. Since SOEs lack shareholders because they are owned by the
government, the ultimate shareholder equivalent in an SOE is the
country’s citizens. Yet, there is a potentially significant agency cost
problem in the arrangement in which citizens’ interests are not
aligned with SOE management, directors, and regulatory overseers.
Behavior of firms in state hands will be less aligned with owner
welfare because the types of incentives used to align behavior that
the market provides are either non-existent or more limited when
dealing with SOEs.
Owners do not have direct ownership rights in the SOE.
Therefore they do not receive the proceeds of the firm. Unlike
ownership rights in private firms, there is a restricted ownership right
in SOEs. Transferability of shares in private firms means that there is
exit by shareholders dissatisfied with managerial decision-making.
This is also an important control mechanism, as a lower share price
creates a threat to management through the market for corporate
control, which SOEs do not face, as this Article will discuss. The
fundamental principal-agent in the SOE context is one that “exists
between taxpayers and the government rather than between the
owner, which is actually the government, and the SOEs.”73 Thus,
this relationship leads to higher agency costs than would exist with
management and owners of private firms. The various internal and
external mechanisms that limit agency cost problems in private firms
71. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990) (suggesting that political pressure affects firm
decision-making).
72. Andre Blais & Stephane Dion, Conclusion: Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers, in
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE 355 (Andre Blais &
Stephane Dion eds., 1991); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS
(1994).
73. Yoichi Takahashi, Does Discipline by SOE Bonds Work?—Japan’s Experience with
Zaito Reform (OECD, Development Research Center of the State Council of PRC, Asian
Development Bank), Jan. 18–19, 2000, at 2.
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are far less effective for SOEs, as the various traditional governance
mechanisms may not fit an SOE that may be unmotivated by profit.
SOEs may not exist to maximize shareholder (citizen) value.
There may be noncommercial activities that an SOE pursues and
potential political interference in the day-to-day management of
SOEs. Worse, if the political elements of government decide SOE
policy, this takes independence and authority away from the SOE
board of directors. There is a growing literature in the United States
on shareholder democracy and accountability of boards and
management.74 Whatever such issues exist among publicly traded
firms, the accountability problems of board and management are
more severe in SOEs, yet have received less attention.
Government may create an uneven playing field in those markets
where an SOE competes with private firms.75 Government has an
interest in ensuring that its state owned firms succeed. As such, the
government as regulator may restrict competition by providing
various benefits to SOEs that it does not offer to other firms.
Though this might result in direct preferences, some of the
preferences might be indirect, such as implicit loan guarantees for
favorable lending, regulatory preferences such as the creation of a
large monopoly position in related industries, limitations on foreign
ownership, or implicit subsidies through a lack of taxation or more
lax corporate governance requirements vis-à-vis private firms. The
nature of SOE regulation might be arbitrary where the only
predictability in regulation may be that government looks to protect
its SOE over all other goals.76 High barriers to entry limit the ability
of the market, through competition, to serve as a check on the poor
decision-making of SOEs.
Alchian made a theoretical prediction that since private firms
behaved differently than state-owned firms, the performance of each
type of firm would vary, with private firms performing more
successfully than state owned firms.77 The costs of decision-making
74. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 835 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power]; Lucian
A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006).
75. See Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China—Scaling the Walls of
Government Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 178–79 (2008).
76. Timothy Irwin & Chiaki Yamamoto, Some Options for Improving the Governance of
State-Owned Electricity Utilities, 7 (World Bank Energy and Mining Sector Board, Working
Paper No. 11, 2004).
77. Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816 (1965).
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remain less concentrated in private firms than in SOEs and there is
more accountability in private firms based on the outcome of such
decisions. It is more difficult to constrain public actors than private
ones because there is less accountability for making a mistake.
Indeed, there is a risk that management may not have an accurate
sense of the organizational structure of an SOE (more than of a
private firm) because of greater principal-agent problems. An SOE
may have many subprincipal agent problems because of what may be
an overly complex chain of command. This reduces accountability,
especially when there are multiple principals (assuming that one can
always identify the principals). Managers in SOEs are less likely to be
fired by the board for making a bad decision and the state is more
likely to bail out a mismanaged SOE. From a theoretical standpoint,
we should expect to see improved performance of a private firm
because the incentives between management and shareholders will
be better aligned for improved performance in firms.78 Empirical
work on the difference in performance between state-owned and
privatized firms confirms this theoretical insight.79 For example,
Shirley and Walsh in their literature review found that among fiftytwo studies they surveyed, in only five of the fifty-two studies did
SOEs outperform private firms.80
D. Internal Controls
1. Corporations
Firms use internal controls to reduce agency cost problems.
Internal controls include managerial participation in ownership,
rewards for management, and the use of the board of directors for
oversight. These internal controls somehow affect firm performance
positively. A number of studies attempt to construct indices of the
quality of corporate governance at the firm level just as LLSV
literature has tried to do at the country level. The three important
78. Carl Shapiro & Robert D. Willig, Economic Rationales For the Scope of Privatization,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 55, 55–56
(Ezra Suleiman & John Waterbury eds., 1990); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole,
Privatization and Incentives, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 84, 87–88 (1991) (explaining the
conventional wisdom in comparing privately-run and publicly-run enterprises); Sappington &
Stiglitz, supra note 65, at 567.
79. Villalonga, supra note 31, at 43.
80. Mary M. Shirley & Patrick Walsh, Public versus Private Ownership: The Current State
of the Debate, 51 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2420, 2001).
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firm level indices of the quality of governance are (a) Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick;81 (b) Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell;82 and (c) Brown
and Caylor.83 Each of these indices associates good corporate
governance with good corporate performance.84 However, studies
that link good corporate governance to strong corporate
performance, for the most part, come up short.85 In terms of the
causality of good governance and corporate performance, perhaps
none of the indices are satisfactory. In an important work that
reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the firm level corporate
governance indices, Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano conclude, “In
short, there is no one ‘best’ measure of corporate governance: the
most effective governance institution appears to depend on context,
and on firms’ specific circumstances.”86 This suggests that
governance may be endogenous to the firm’s characteristics.
Undertaking an analysis of individual corporate governance
controls is somewhat risky because the empirical literature is
inconclusive at best.87 The present Article is more modest in its
claims about corporate governance and corporate performance. It
describes within one particular industry sector in which there are
many SOEs across countries, how corporate governance mechanisms
may be limited in effectiveness. Given that these firms are not
publicly traded, it is more difficult, from the standpoint of data
collection, to prove that these are well or not well run firms. Even if
one could collect the data successfully, there might be significant
endogeneity problems that would limit any conclusions that one
could draw about SOE governance.

81. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
82. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance? 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009).
83. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm
Valuation, 25 J. ACCT & PUB. POL’Y 409 (2006).
84. Id.; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, supra note 81; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Farrell, supra
note 82.
85. Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789,
800 (2007) (“Although dozens of papers have tried to find relationships between particular
governance practices and corporate performance, most fail to find any strong connection, and
the few studies that do . . . often are not supported by other researchers.”(internal citation
omitted)).
86. Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1808 (2008).
87. Id. at 1814.
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2. Managerial ownership and pay
Jensen and Meckling, in their seminal work on agency costs,
found that increased managerial ownership led to reduced agency
costs and thus increased maximization of the firm.88 Work by other
scholars yields similar conclusions.89 Building from this insight, some
scholars have qualified the role that management’s ownership of a
firm plays in improved firm outcomes. Too high an ownership level
may reduce corporate performance because it may reduce the ability
to dismiss ineffective management. Yet, some level of corporate
ownership by management may increase firm performance.90 In
many cases, SOE managers do not face the types of financial rewards
of private firms. SOE managers cannot be rewarded additional
compensation based on an increase of the SOE’s stock price.
Firms enter into contracts with management that create
incentives for performance-based pay.91 Pay incentives through
contracts, if calibrated correctly, align the incentives of management
to that of shareholders.92 This is not to suggest that too generous a
pay scheme might not create distortions of its own. Bebchuk and
Fried are critical about overly generous management compensation.
They argue that executive compensation is not the product of arm’s
length bargaining between managers and the board to maximize

88. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
89. John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt,
39 J. FIN. ECON. 131 (1995); Eric R. Gedajlovic & Daniel M. Shapiro, Management and
Ownership Effects: Evidence from Five Countries, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 533 (1998);
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct
Incentives on Firm Performance, 20 FIN. MGMT. 101 (1991).
90. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and
Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988).
91. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensations: Managerial Power Versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 850 (2002) (questioning the
managerial power hypothesis by noting that “CEOs hired from the outside with no ties to the
existing board enjoy especially attractive pay packages . . . .”); see also Randall S. Thomas &
Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH.
U. L.Q. 569 (2001).
92. Guido Ferrarini & Niamh Moloney, Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context
for Reform, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 304 (2005).
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shareholder value.93 Nevertheless, even such critics do not oppose
the use of incentive pay, in principle.94
It is possible to create incentive based compensation for SOEs.
However, SOE incentives are different from private firms in that the
choice of managers may be made on a political basis rather than
merit. Moreover, the goals based upon the incentives may not be
profit based. Perhaps this explains why in the SOE context, these
incentive contracts have not met with success.95 This is not surprising
as, theoretically, such compensation in SOEs will be less effective
because it will be, by nature, less based on market outcomes than
private firms.96
Data from recently privatized firms shows that managerial pay
increases post-privatization significantly, even when the managers are
the same.97 The explanation for these findings is that there is a high
correlation of the increase in salary and potential profits of the
firms.98 From this, one might conjecture that SOE managers actually
have reason to maximize their budget rather than efficiency for much
the reason that other bureaucrats do—to increase their power.99

93. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 764–74
(2002).
94. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 189–90 (2006).
95. Mary M. Shirley & Lixin Colin Xu, The Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts:
Evidence from China (World Bank, Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper no.
1919, 1998); Mary M. Shirley & Lixin Colin Xu, Information, Incentives, and Commitment:
An Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises (World Bank,
Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper no. 1769, 1997).
96. Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 61, at 1428. Political constraints play a role to
limit the pay of management in regulated industries. Paul L. Joskow, Nancy L. Rose &
Catherine D. Wolfram, Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the
Electric Utility Industry, 27 RAND J. ECON 165 (1996). In some settings, this may suggest
that inefficiencies will exist in both SOEs and private firms in regulated industries will negate
ownership effects. R. Richard Geddes, Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in
the Electric Utility Industry, 40 J.L. & ECON. 261, 284 (1997) (“Controlling for firm size,
managers in government utilities do not have longer tenure in their jobs than their
counterparts in private firms.”).
97. Catherine D. Wolfram, Increases in Executive Pay Following Privatization, 7 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 327 (1998).
98. Id.
99. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
36–42 (1971) (explaining the budget maximizing behavior of bureaucrats).
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3. Board oversight
A firm has a board of directors rather than an executive who
rules by fiat because deliberation of a group with complementary
skills and oversight duties should lead to better business outcomes.
The board serves to monitor managers on behalf of shareholders. In
theory, the board protects shareholders from potentially risky and
costly managerial mistakes in strategy. The board also provides
oversight to ensure that management does not shirk its
responsibilities. Some work suggests that independent board
oversight is central to ensure that managers do not receive
overcompensation for their work.100
Just as manager-shareholder incentives may not be aligned,
director-shareholder incentives likewise may not be aligned. One way
to reduce the director-shareholder misalignment is through equitybased compensation for directors. Empirical evidence suggests that
this approach has been effective in aligning the interests of outside
directors with shareholders in certain circumstances.101 This is not to
suggest that it is effective in all circumstances, but that given the
right amount of incentives (not too much and not too little), equity
can align the incentives of directors and shareholders.
Diffuse ownership of shares may present some problems in terms
of organizing shareholders to reduce the agency costs of ownership.
Monitoring costs may be high because of diffuse ownership. This
may allow management to co-opt directors. Shareholders may
remain passive in their ownership because of the high cost of
monitoring and potential for free riding off of the work of other

100. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); see Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO
Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 453–55 (1988); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Trends in Corporate
Governance, 60 J. FIN. 2351, 2371 (2005) (“[I]t is possible that average CEO compensation is
higher at firms with less diligent boards.”). But see David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of
Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185 (1996) (finding an inverse
association between the fraction of outside directors and Tobin’s Q).
101. Mine Ertugrul & Shantaram Hegde, Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs
of Debt, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 512, 529–30 (2008) (finding that stock and option compensation
for outside directors is more effective than cash in terms of creating effective monitoring
incentives); Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation for
Outside Directors on Firm Value, 78 J. BUS. 2229 (2005) (finding in a sample of Fortune 1000
firms that those firms that have outside director options have significantly higher market to
book ratios and profitability metrics than those without outsider director options).
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larger shareholders. However, corporate law has certain protections
for minority shareholders.102
There is criticism about the director-centric approach to
corporate law.103 Bebchuck has articulated concern that a board of
directors may not use its powers to maximize the well-being of
shareholders.104 Even if Bebchuk is correct—if we take the claim
seriously that institutional investor activism can provide increased
shareholder control105—then SOE governance is particularly
problematic. There is near nonexistent shareholder equivalent
activism in SOEs. There are no institutional investors that can push
for greater voice for shareholders. That is, in SOEs, the voice of any
shareholder equivalent (a voter) cannot easily be aggregated the way
that institutional investors can aggregate votes because of collective
action problems.106 The organizational costs of most SOEs are larger
because it is more difficult to fire people in government than in
private firms—SOEs are less responsive to market forces.
Other factors distinguish corporate governance of SOEs.
Property rights in private firms are transferable. An SOE lacks such
transferability. The only way that SOE shareholder equivalents can
vote with their feet is indirectly through national elections, where a
new party might impose a different set of priorities for SOEs. The
effect is a disconnect between present behavior and future outcome
that a listed stock provides nongovernment owned firms. Because of
the non-transferability of ownership, there is less incentive to
monitor because the principal cannot create more value that she can
then capture through a sale of the ownership stake.107 Without
effective monitoring, it is easier for managers in SOEs to make poor
decisions because of a lack of accountability for the consequences of

102. Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119
(2003); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Re-examined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
103. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006).
104. Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 74, at 910.
105. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675
(2007); Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 74; see Lisa Fairfax,
Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53 (2008).
106. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTION ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (1965) (explaining
collective action problems).
107. Louis De Alessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence, in 2
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 27–28 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed., 1980).
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such decisions. SOE managers and directors do not face
repercussions such as termination for poor decision making.108
E. External Controls
External controls refer to elements outside of the firm that limit
agency costs of managers. Such exogenous elements include the
market for corporate control, the equity market, the bond market,
the market for managers, and bankruptcy.
1. Market for corporate control
Henry Manne first identified the market for corporate control.109
Managers may be replaced through takeovers. If management
decision making is poor, this will be reflected in a depressed stock
price for the firm. If management is ineffective, the stock price of the
corporation should fall. A lower stock price due to poor
management is an invitation for a potential takeover. A takeover is
more likely because the corporation can be bought on the cheap.
The possibility of takeover via a hostile acquisition such as a
tender offer or proxy contest creates incentives for managers within
the firm. These incentives discipline managerial behavior. In a
takeover, the new owners are likely to replace poorly performing
managers. Conversely, if management performs well, the stock price
of the corporation is more likely to rise. This will reduce the
possibility of takeover of the corporation because the cost of shares
increases, which reduces the difference between the potential
arbitrage of current versus potential share price.110 Managers,
therefore, should keep their jobs when they perform well.
The theory of the market as a corporate control has been
supplemented by empirical work. An unwise acquisition bid by
management can have a negative effect on an acquirer, including the

108. Except perhaps in authoritarian regimes where bad decision making by executives of
SOEs might lead to imprisonment or firing squad.
109. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965).
110. JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 119 (2008); Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982) (explaining the
incentives for management to avoid takeovers in the market for corporate control).
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acquiring firm becoming a future target itself.111 Nevertheless, the
market for corporate control is far more limited than theory would
predict. This is due to various legal mechanisms such as poison pills
and staggered boards that limit the ability to undertake hostile
takeovers (at least in the United States). These types of defensive
mechanisms allow management to become entrenched from
takeovers, which creates inefficiencies as an expense that the
shareholders must bear.112
Though control problems will occur even in private firms, these
distortions are not as severe as those of government owned firms.
SOEs are not subject to the same sorts of repercussions from bad
management. Because of government ownership, SOEs do not face
acquisition threats from firms that may be able to unlock value from
the firm through better management. Unlike private firms, SOEs do
not operate under hard budget constraints. Instead, they operate
under what economists term “soft” budget constraints.113 These
constraints are “soft” because another institution (in our case,
another part of government) will pay the shortfall for
mismanagement of the SOE. Such firms do not fear the negative
consequences of bad mistakes because even a chronic loss making
firm will be bailed out by the state. Managers of the SOE will expect
this external financial assistance and as such, may not undertake the
types of sound and profitable strategies of private firms.
2. Equity
Publicly traded shares of stock provide information on the
relative state of a firm. The capital markets provide a signal about the
valuation based on discounted value of profits of a firm, which is
based on the current and future state of the management team and

111. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 372 (1990); Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann & Rene M. Stulz, Firm
Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201 (2004).
112. JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES MADE, PROMISES
BROKEN 118–126 (2008); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize
Firm Value?: Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88–91 (2001)
(providing a literature review that supports a management entrenchment hypothesis).
113. Janos Kornai, The Soft Budget Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 3 (1986); Janos Kornai, Eric
Maskin & Gerard Roland, Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 1095
(2003). There are political economy reasons why soft budget constraints exist. They may keep
social peace, maintain artificially high levels of employment, or respond to political needs to
subsidize firms.
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its decisions.114 We assume that the market appropriately prices the
value of the ownership right. Even, however, if the market does not,
it is still a better indicator of the value based on performance than
measures of public sector performance management. SOEs are not
publicly traded, so they lack this signal of firm performance that
equity markets provide.
3. Debt
Debt is a mechanism to control and measure the performance of
the firm. If a firm issues debt, there are consequences on firm
management. Debt reduces free cash flow. This disciplines
management because there is less money to spend due to the need to
service the debt. There is also a signaling function to debt. Firms
that are poorly managed and are in financial difficulty will have a
poor debt rating. If a firm has a poor debt rating, it will be more
expensive for a firm to borrow money since the rating will reflect the
possibility that the debt may not be repaid. Banks frequently review
credit decisions. Moreover, a credit rating agency such as Moody’s
and Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) rate borrowers and update such
ratings. These regular recalibrations in the market for debt send a
signal about the health of a given firm. If a firm’s rating were to
deteriorate, it would signal to the market that the firm has
undertaken harmful decisions that have increased firm risk.
There are limits to the amount of trust to place in credit rating
agencies as gatekeepers to promote better corporate behavior.115
Subprime mortgages are one such example of the limits. Rating
agencies may serve as ineffective gatekeepers because they may
become complacent with bad management if it serves the purpose of
the rating agencies.116 Put differently, ratings agencies may have
mixed incentives. Rating agencies receive payment by the issuer of

114. KENNETH R. FERRIS & BARBARA S. PÈCHEROT PETITT, VALUATION: AVOIDING
74 (2002).
115. On the role of gatekeepers in the corporate context, see for example, Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323
(2007); Merrit B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1089 (2008).
116. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 329, 342 (2003).
THE WINNER’S CURSE
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the bonds that the agency rates.117 Moreover, rating agencies create
pressure on the issuers that they rate to purchase ancillary services
such as pre-rating advice and consultations.118
There should be a risk premium associated with borrowing
money for an SOE. Banks should lend at a higher rate of interest to
SOEs since SOEs are more likely to be poorly managed relative to
private firms. However, because the government either explicitly or
tacitly guarantees this debt (which it does not do for most private
firms), SOEs have an advantage over their private competitors. In
November 2004, S&P put out a research paper that identified how
they analyze debt of SOE postal providers. Ratings reflect the
corporate governance of the SOE and the general supportiveness of
the regulatory regime to the interests of the SOE.119
One critical element to S&P’s analysis was to assess the level and
intensity of state support of the firm. Where relations with the
government are not seen as arms length and there is a debt
guarantee, the credit quality of postal providers reflects the rating of
the underlying government. If there is not such explicit support,
S&P will examine whether there has been a history of providing
financial support to other SOEs of that country. Ratings also reflect
the possibility of privatization and the effect that privatization might
have on state support. Perversely, the softer the budget, the weaker
the punishment of a potential low rating because the greater the
likelihood that the government will bail out the firm of its debt
obligations. Such ratings reward inefficiency and create perverse
incentives for SOEs.
4. Market for managers
An informal mechanism to reduce agency costs is the reputation
of managers. Success or failure at a firm would, in theory, affect the
ability of managers to negotiate their next contract and therefore
future wages.120 Therefore, reputational consequences may force a

117. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 653–63 (1999).
118. Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SUP. 341, 345 (2006).
119. Standard & Poor’s, “International Postal Entities: Influence of Government Support
on Ratings,” Nov. 22, 2004.
120. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
292 (1980).

1740

DO NOT DELETE

1713

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

Competition Policy

manager to better run a firm to preserve his or her reputation going
forward. Moreover, for managers at the end of their career,
reputation still may be an important factor in leaving behind a
“legacy” at a firm. This is not to suggest that some managers will be
willing to risk long term reputation for short term gain. Corporate
scandals such as Worldcom, Enron, and Tyco teach us otherwise.121
Rather, in a number of cases reputation does serve to limit agency
cost problems and the Enrons of the world are most likely outliers.122
In SOEs, managers may be poorly monitored relative to private
firms. With SOEs, it is more difficult to measure reputation based on
performance. Because of the lack of external controls such as access
to the capital markets for equity and debt, it is more difficult to rate
the performance of managers.123 However, because the firm may not
be profit maximizing, managers will be secure in their jobs regardless
of firm performance. Many potential managers will choose careers in
the private sector rather than the public sector because of greater
pay, greater potential upside incentives for increased pay and in terms
of risk taking and innovation. This is not to suggest that other
excellent people do not choose government service within an SOE
out of a sense of civic duty or altruistic motivations. Rather, for those
managers in SOEs who are inferior to their counterparts in private
firms, there is greater job security.124 With market based
accountability in private firms, it is easier to fire under-performing
managers. At SOEs, it is more difficult to fire under-performers
because standards are not clear or not important. Reputation matters
little if you have lifetime employment, particularly because of how
difficult it is to fire government workers relative to private works in

121. For a theoretical analysis of such scandals, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 138 (observing that managers will risk reputation
“if the immediate gains are large enough and if they cannot be required to disgorge their illgotten gains”).
122. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 37–42 (2006) (articulating the costly compliance costs of
Sarbanes-Oxley).
123. Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 61, at 1428.
124. Likewise, privatizing certain government work may create perverse incentives in
terms of additional management duties for the most capable of government employees. See
Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of Science in Environmental Law: Why We Should, Why
We Don't, and How We Can, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (2008).
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many countries. As such, there is less accountability for poor
performance and less incentive to provide good performance.125
5. Bankruptcy
Forced exit through bankruptcy is a potential outcome for a
poorly managed firm. Bankruptcy is one mechanism by which firms
exit the market. It is the legal process through which the exit process
unfolds for financially distressed firms. The risk of bankruptcy and
possible liquidation forces many firms to undertake less risk because
of the potential negative consequences of overly risky strategies. In
contrast to private firms, SOEs generally do not go bankrupt
(though countries sometimes do).126 The lack of bankruptcy means
that SOE managers do not face the same constraints as private firms
for making mistakes. Without the potential specter of bankruptcy,
SOEs might expand businesses even if there is not a profit making
case to do so.
F. Transparency
Transparency is important both internally within the firm and
externally to potential investors. The board of directors and
shareholders need to understand the financial situation of a firm.
Transparency is a necessary part of improved corporate governance.
Usually, corporate governance reformers focus on independent
boards. Yet, as Adams and Ferreira note, “unless boards are given
better access to information, simply increasing board [outside]
independence is not sufficient to improve governance.”127
Transparency plays a critical role because it allows the board to
evaluate the business situation and provide effective management
oversight. Increased transparency and effective corporate governance
work hand-in-hand to monitor managers against shirking and
stealing.128 Cross country empirical work suggests that improved
corporate transparency leads to greater efficiency across sectors.129
125. Where there are good performers at SOEs, these stars may get poached to the
private sector, which provides greater financial rewards.
126. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF
OECD COUNTRIES 14 (2005).
127. Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 235
(2007).
128. Richard A. Lambert, Contracting Theory and Accounting, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 3
(2001) (“much of the motivation for focusing on objective and verifiable information and for
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Externally, the market cannot accurately value a firm if there is
insufficient transparency.130 Transparency in private firms occurs
through the reporting regime of securities law. A mandatory
reporting regime reduces monitoring costs.131 Private firms that trade
in public securities markets utilize transparent reporting to better
inform investors/owners about the potential quality of management.
As Cross and Prentice summarize, “The [U.S.] federal securities laws
are directed at the basic economic problem of investor risk by
providing some legal guarantee of disclosure (reducing information
asymmetry risk and transaction costs otherwise required for
monitoring) and legal recourse for dishonest representations or
omissions.”132 Nevertheless, a literature review on disclosure suggests
that the effect of mandatory transparency remains unclear.133
Transparency exists not only at the level of securities disclosure
overall, but at the level of audits that firms must undertake as part of
compliance. With high levels of transparency (whether mandatory or
voluntary), it is possible to audit a firm to determine if stated results
are the same as actual results. Auditing provides a mechanism to
review the books of the firm to ensure that stated performance

conservatism in financial reporting lies with incentive problems”) (italics added); Paul G.
Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455–56 (1997).
129. Jere R. Francis, Shawn Huang, Raynolde Pereira & Inder K. Khurana, Does
Corporate Transparency Contribute to Efficient Resource Allocation?, J. ACCT. RES.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407065); Art
Durnev, Vihang Errunza & Alexander Molchanov, Predation and Investment Efficiency: Does
Corporate Transparency Reduce Growth? (McGill Working Paper Group), available at
http://web.management.mcgill.ca/Art.Durnev/Corporate%20transparency.pdf.
130. Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1817, 1828–33 (2007); Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 159, 162–66 (2007).
131. Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 363–64 (2006) (providing the background for disclosure); Robert
A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is
the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1858–60 (2007) (discussing empirical “literature
indicat[ing] that capital markets are improved by vigorous securities regulation featuring
mandatory disclosure requirements, insider trading prohibitions, strong public enforcement,
and provision of private remedies for defrauded investors”) (citations omitted).
132. Cross & Prentice, supra note 131, at 364.
133. Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting
and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (Mar. 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398 (“Generally speaking, our survey finds a
paucity of evidence on market wide and aggregate economic and social consequences of
reporting and disclosure regulation, rather than the consequences of individual firms’
accounting and disclosure choices.”) (manuscript at 2).
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matches actual performance.134 This assumes, of course, that we trust
auditors.135 In the SOE context, this also assumes that we trust the
auditing function of auditing firms over the auditing function of
another part of government, which perhaps we might trust even less.
Reputational concerns keep the monitoring function of audits higher
than government audits because of concerns of managers or public
perception of the role of the auditors. Poorly done audits will not
lead to repeat business for the auditing firm in the private sector.
With all the problems of private auditing firms, we still may prefer
them to audits by other parts of government that may have even
more reason to manipulate the results to look the “right” way.
Not all SOEs have strong transparency that allows for internal
and external control or for an independent audit. Indeed, a common
problem among SOEs is the lack of transparency. As a World Bank
report states, “Internal and external financial and non-financial
reporting is incomplete and inaccurate, does not provide an adequate
basis for decision-making by boards and executive managers, and
misleads government owners, legislatures and the public.”136 Because
of a general lack of transparency of SOEs, it is oftentimes difficult to
evaluate their costs relative to private firms.137
III. POSTAL ECONOMICS
Having addressed corporate governance of both government and
private firms in the previous section, this section provides an
overview of the postal sector, which serves as a case study of
governance concerns of SOEs. The purpose of postal services is to
deliver mail from one location to another. Because of the recent
134. Ronald A. Dye, Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth, 101 J.
POL. ECON. 887, 908 (1993) (explaining how auditing firms price their services); Srikant
Datar & Michael Alles, The Formation and Role of Reputation and Litigation in the AuditorManager Relationship, 4 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 401, 401 (1995) (showing that
“reputation formation by the auditor serves as a substitute for costly contracting, monitoring,
and litigation by the owner”). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004) (arguing that as
gatekeepers, auditing firms were asleep at the wheel in some rather large and important
corporate fiascos).
135. See Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, The Credit Ratings Game (Bergen
Meetings Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342986 (suggesting
that we have reason to be suspicious of auditing firm reporting).
136. Scott, supra note 70, at 4.
137. OECD, DRAFT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY IN STATE OWNERSHIP 6 (2008).
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communications revolution, this delivery system may be somewhat
anachronistic. However, at present, letter mail remains an important
part of the information infrastructure. The size of the postal sector
immunized from direct competition (called the “reserve” sector
because the monopoly is reserved for this sector) varies from country
to country. The scope of the postal monopoly affects competition in
the postal market. Additionally, a monopoly in the reserved sector
may create additional distortions of competition. In some cases,
revenues from the reserved sector may be used to anti-competitively
cross subsidize those parts of business in which the post office must
compete with other providers.138 Firms that have a postal monopoly
have immunity from competition in their core business. Corporate
governance seems to be worse in such firms that lack competition, as
theory would suggest, as the subsequent sections in this Article
suggest. Postal SOEs compete in related services such as in express
delivery services, banking, or insurance.
This section explains the importance of postal services. Then it
explains why postal services have been treated as a regulated industry.
Regulation has led to competition issues and various mechanisms in
which government has distorted the competitive market to favor its
postal SOEs. This section then provides an overview of corporate
governance and antitrust of SOE postal firms in a number of
jurisdictions before providing a more in depth study of both
corporate governance and antitrust of the United States to provide
contrasting approaches.

138. Cross subsidization was one of the chief concerns of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division in the AT&T decision. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 1387,
1391–92 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Trinko seems to suggest that proper regulatory oversight
diminishes the need for antitrust to address such concerns. Verizon Commc’ns., Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). The concern of potential cross
subsidization and monopoly leverage also plays out in a European context. Cross subsidization
between the postal reserve sector and the competitive sector constitutes state aid. Case C39/94 SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 ECR I-3547. It may also allow for claims under abuse of
dominance provisions. Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 27. Some
predation may be possible even with private firms that operate in network industries in which
there is some additional layer of sector regulation. Sector regulation allows the government to
assist in predation by private firms. Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable
Television: Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 65 (1990) (addressing how
government distortions created duplicative networks); James C. Miller III & Paul Pautler,
Predation: The Changing View in Economics and the Law, 28 J.L. & ECON. 495, 500–02
(1985).
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A. Importance of Postal and Express Services
Services have become an increasingly important part of the global
economy. Services help facilitate increased specialization and scale
across a number of fields, thus allowing for increased economic
growth.139 Postal and related services are among the services that
underpin the functioning of the global economy. They facilitate the
movement of goods and services both within a country and across
countries. Recent theoretical work suggests that problems within a
production chain can have a significant impact on output reduction
if inputs enter the production chain in a complementary fashion.140
For example, an increase in productivity in the transportation sector
will raise the output in capital equipment. This in turn will raise
output in the transportation sector.141 Where there is a weak link,
this has dynamic effects on economic development. Bad corporate
governance and anti-competitive practices in the larger postal sector
may be such a weak link to a country’s economic development.
Distortions in this sector may negatively impact the growth and
development of alternative forms of information systems and
communication. This is but one such network industry (banking,
telecom, energy) that has country-wide implications.
Postal services are among the least competitive network
industries in the world. Whereas other network industries, such as
telecommunications and energy, have been liberalized and opened to
various levels of competition, postal services remain heavily regulated
statutory monopoly providers in most countries.142 In nearly every
country, the government has designated a postal monopoly for a
portion of services that facilitate the movement of products from one

139. Joseph Francois, Producer Services, Scale, and the Division of Labor, 42 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 715, 715 (1990); James Melvin, Trade in Producer Services: A Heckscher-Ohlin
Approach, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1180 (1989); Wilfred Ethier & Henrik Horn, Services in
International Trade, in THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 223, 223 (Elhanan
Helpman & Assaf Razin eds., 1991).
140. Charles I. Jones, The Weak Link Theory of Economic Development, 1 (Berkeley,
Working Paper, 2007) (on file with author).
141. Id. at 5.
142. Damien Géradin & David Henry, Regulatory and Competition Law Remedies in the
Postal Sector, in REMEDIES IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES, COMPETITION LAW AND SECTORSPECIFIC REGULATION (Damien Géradin ed., 2004); Charles Kenny, Questioning the
Monopoly-Supported Postal USO in Developing Countries, in PROGRESS TOWARD
LIBERALIZATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR (Michael A. Crew & Paul R.
Kleindorfer eds., 2006).
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location to another (the “reserved” sector). In a number of cases, the
postal sector has been immunized directly from antitrust suits. In
other settings, the postal sector receives implied immunity from
antitrust suits because of a preference of sector regulation over
antitrust where sector regulators may not push competition as much
as an antitrust agency might. There is an extensive literature of
regulatory capture that explains why sector regulators may behave
more favorably to the industries they govern.143
There are also non-antitrust competition policy distortions in the
postal sector. The very nature of government ownership provides
advantages such as lower cost of capital or exemptions from paying
taxes.144 Thus, SOE postal providers may not have the same capital
costs as private ones because of these indirect government
subsidies.145
B. Regulation of Postal Service
Generally, a sector regulator provides oversight over the
regulatory aspects of postal services. In some countries, the same
regulator may provide financial oversight as well as regulatory
oversight. In other countries, financial oversight may be a function
of a different government agency than regulatory oversight. A
complicating factor in postal sector regulation is that sector
regulators may need to make trade-offs between goals. Postal services
have two potentially competing goals. One is a market correction
function that serves the public interest. A country will regulate postal
services to ensure service where otherwise there would not be
coverage. Government does this through the use of universal service
obligations (USOs). A second function of postal regulation is to
provide services in a way that limits distortions on competition.146
Because of potential conflicts between these two goals of postal
143. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 475–514 (1993); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE
III 523 (2003).
144. The USPS does not have to pay taxes but private firms do. J. GREGORY SIDAK &
DANIEL F. SPULBER, PROTECTING COMPETITION FROM THE POSTAL MONOPOLY 2 (1996).
145. OECD, REGULATING MARKET ACTIVITIES BY PUBLIC SECTOR, DAF/COMP 36
(2004).
146. Damien Géradin & J. Gregory Sidak, The Future of the U.S. Postal Service: American
and European Perspectives After the Presidential Commission and Flamingo Industries, 28
WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 163 (2005) (explaining competition policy and postal
services).
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regulation, situations may arise that may limit rather than create
societal welfare. One potential effect of this interaction is to destroy
the impetus to innovate and create new services that allow consumers
to get goods from one place to another. Another is that the USO
may be used to achieve anti-competitive ends. With competing
interests, a sector regulator may not be as effective as an antitrust
enforcer to improve efficiency. This is particularly true when the
sector regulator also has the powers of competition enforcement.147
C. Potential Anti-Competitive Abuses in the Postal Industry
The postal sector traditionally has been vertically integrated. This
leads to problems when government liberalizes only parts of the
postal sector. When a government introduces competition to a
vertically integrated industry, there are three potential types of anticompetitive abuses: discrimination, inflated transfer prices, and crosssubsidization.148 Price discrimination is not in itself a concern of
antitrust and occurs when a seller charges different prices to buyers
for the same product or service.149 Price discrimination can take on
an anti-competitive effect if a postal service can limit access to its
network or tie its regulated and unregulated services and thus create
a loss to consumers.150
A postal monopolist also may use its monopoly in postal services
to over-charge itself for inputs through transfer-pricing strategies.
Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of various inputs within the
same firm for goods and services. As a vertically integrated firm deals
between affiliates, it can create a situation in which it prefers to deal
with itself at inflated prices (which it captures through higher rates
among its regulated customers) rather than deal with unaffiliated

147. This is not limited to the postal sector. These same concerns appear in many sectors.
Italy and Brazil are good examples of this point in relation to banking and insurance. Darryl
Biggar & Alberto Heimler, An Increasing Role for Competition in the Regulation of Banks,
ICN 22 (2005).
148. Timothy J. Brennan, Should the Flamingo Fly? Using Competition Law to Limit the
Scope of Postal Monopolies, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 197, 202–04 (2005).
149. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 721b, at 262
(2d ed. 2002).
150. For a recent example of this effect, see Italian Authority Probes Activities of Post
Office for Abuse of Dominance, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. DAILY, Apr. 29, 2009.
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providers.151 This anti-competitive self-dealing allows companies to
subsidize the upstream market or to create a price squeeze on
downstream competitors.
Cross-subsidization occurs where a postal incumbent provider
uses its network inputs in the regulated sector to compete in the
unregulated sector. However, the postal incumbent allocates all or a
disproportionate cost of the network to the regulated sector rather
than the unregulated sector. When a sector regulator or antitrust
enforcer does not detect this misallocation and remedy it, a postal
monopolist can utilize an anti-competitive cross-subsidy.152 Because
of this misallocation of prices, cross-subsidization allows firms in the
regulated sector that have a monopoly to exclude in the unregulated
sector. They do so in part by preventing an efficient entrant from
achieving economies of scope, which the incumbent has in the
regulated sector because of its designated monopoly.153
In some cases, the regulated monopolists may have the means to
price below marginal cost for a sustained period of time and engage
in predation.154 This is particularly possible in the case of postal
SOEs.155 Similarly, postal SOEs may be more likely to be able to raise
the cost of rivals because of the SOEs’ incentive to be a revenue
maximizer and increase its output and scale. They also may be able
to effectively shape government regulation to raise rivals’ costs
directly by creating an expansive reserve sector. Such behavior limits
the potential economies of scope and scale of potential rivals.156 Part
V will elaborate on these issues.
These three types of problems have two types of effects on postal
and related markets. Directly, they impact the ability of companies to
enter and compete in a given country through the erection of high

151. Alexander C. Larson & Steve G. Parsons, An Economic Analysis of Transfer Pricing
and Imputation Policies for Public Utilities, in INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR PUBLIC
UTILITIES (Michael A. Crew ed., 1994).
152. OECD, INTERNATIONAL PARCEL DELIVERY, OCDE/GD (97)151, 97 (1997).
153. David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned
Enterprises, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479, 511–12 (2003).
154. Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 27.
155. On SOE predation, see generally David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak,
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises, 22 REV. INDUS. ORG. 183, 199
(2003).
156. Id. at 197–98; see J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, PROTECTING
COMPETITION FROM THE POSTAL MONOPOLY 18–31 (1996) (discussing the Postal Service’s
statutory monopoly over letter delivery).
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entry barriers. Anti-competitive behavior also directly impacts
companies that compete internationally because of the ability of
SOEs to use cross-subsidies to expand internationally. This allows for
the export of anti-competitive conduct into other jurisdictions.
Domestic antitrust institutions in the foreign markets are ill equipped
to address anti-competitive conduct by foreign postal services
because of a lack of an effective supra-national regulatory regime
(except in the case of the EU). Indirectly, there is an even greater
harm. Market failure due to government intervention that allows for
anti-competitive conduct affects exporters from both developing and
developed countries from using a critical part of delivery
infrastructure to provide fast shipment of goods and services.
There is a secondary effect of a concentrated postal market due
to government preferences that favor incumbent postal SOEs. A
focus on postal national champions may stymie domestic innovation
from small and medium sized entities (SMEs) both in postal services
and in the economy overall. In OECD countries, over 95% of all
firms are SMEs. Of OECD SMEs, 30–60% can be categorized as
innovative firms.157 A similar percentage of firms within the
developing world are SMEs.158 If one believes that SMEs are a
growth engine for the economy, one should be concerned that the
dynamic effects of SMEs may be limited because of the inability of
private firms to offer new services and product and service
innovations to these SMEs.159 Whereas large firms may function well
in either a good or bad institutional setting, SMEs require high
quality institutions to allow for competitive entry into markets.160
D. Problem of Universal Service Obligations
An often-made argument by postal incumbents is that the postal
provision requires antitrust immunities, such as a statutory monopoly
to serve the USO. Under the USO, the postal service provides all
157. OECD, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Local Strength, Global Reach, OECD
OBSERVER, June 2000, at 1.
158. Marta Kozak, World Bank Small and Medium Enterprise Database, INT’L FIN.
CORP. (IFC) (last updated Jan. 26, 2007), http://rru.worldbank.org/ Documents/other/
MSMEdatabase/msme_database.htm.
159. Though there is no empirical evidence for this proposition, this is a function of data
limitations.
160. See generally Thorsten Beck et al., Financial and Legal Constraints to Firm Growth:
Does Firm Size Matter?, 60 J. FIN. 137 (2005) (concluding that the smallest firms are the most
negatively impacted when financial and institutional development is weak).
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consumers with mail service, even those for whom it is not profitable
to provide such a service, such as in rural areas.161 Incumbent postal
providers argue that liberalization of postal services would allow for
potential cream skimming of the most profitable customers. Postal
incumbents, however, would need to continue to serve unprofitable
routes as part of a USO. This situation would leave an incumbent
provider with a graveyard spiral of higher costs and forced rate
increases as all but the unprofitable customers leave the incumbent.
Such an outcome would result in the end of the cross-subsidy that
allows for universal service.
In a number of cases, these concerns are unfounded.162 For
example, empirical evidence suggests that there is no urban-to-rural
cross-subsidy by the U.S. Postal Service.163 Therefore, in a world of
liberalization or privatization, rural service would continue to
exist.164 This reduces the argument for a monopoly based on the
need to preserve a USO. The USO argument does not hold for most
jurisdictions around the world. Experience in other countries
illustrates that a USO cross-subsidy can be replaced altogether with
targeted subsidies for low income and other groups.165 In other
161. In the developing world, a USO may make even less sense because of the cost of the
postal monopoly model and its effect on sector development. Many consumers in developing
countries use postal services infrequently, if at all, and a developing world USO will rarely be
used to help the poor. This makes a USO not sustainable given the lack of scale economies. See
generally Charles Kenny, Questioning the Monopoly-Supported Postal USO in Developing
Countries, in PROGRESS TOWARD LIBERALIZATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR
75 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2006) [hereinafter PROGRESS (Crew &
Kleindorfer)] (arguing for a “competitive approach involving universal access” for services the
poor need).
162. USOs are used in a number of liberalized regulatory markets, like telecom.
163. Robert H. Cohen et al., The Cost of Universal Service in the U.S. and its Impact on
Competition, in The Proceedings of Wissenschaftliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste
GmbH (WIK) 7th Köenigswinter Seminar on “Contestability and Barriers to Entry in Postal
Markets” 5 (Draft 2003), 1–2; RICK GEDDES, SAVING THE MAIL: HOW TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE 3 (2003).
164. See Robert H. Cohen et al., Rural Delivery and the Universal Service Obligation: A
Quantitative Investigation, in REGULATION AND THE NATURE OF POSTAL AND DELIVERY
SERVICES 170–71 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 1993). Similarly, theoretical
work suggests that there would be no such graveyard spiral in the United States if it were to
remove the USPS monopoly of letter delivery. See Robert Cohen et al., An Empirical Analysis
of the Graveyard Spiral, in COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY
SECTOR 121–22 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2004). See generally Michael A.
Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, The Welfare Effects of Entry and Strategies for Maintaining the
USO in the Postal Sector, in PROGRESS (Crew & Kleindorfer), supra note 161, at 359
(projecting the potential of small welfare gains in the U.S. with the elimination of the USO).
165. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 164–66 (2002).
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markets where postal markets have been liberalized, these countries
have not abandoned the USO.166
An uncompetitive postal sector may create incentives for
politicians to create a large USO fee. One danger of a USO is that
the fee will be set too high. An overly high USO allows the
possibility that a postal provider can use funds from an overly
generous USO to cross-subsidize into the non-reserve market.167 The
non-reserve or competitive sector includes related services, such as
express delivery services, where postal providers compete with
international express services firms, such as FedEx and UPS. Thus,
anti-competitive conduct of postal services focuses primarily in
express delivery services, although it also affects hybrid mail services
and other services offered by postal incumbents, such as banking and
insurance. The smaller the reserve sector is in a particular country,
the less likely anti-competitive conduct will spill over into related
products and services.
E. Scope and Problem of SOEs in the Postal Sector
State ownership may reflect a particular problem in postal and
related services.168 Unlike other network industries, for the most part
postal services remain in state hands.169 There are unique challenges
to this sector because of the nature of state ownership and state
facilitated restraints on competition. SOEs may be more, rather than
less, likely to make a market less competitive because of their ability
166. See generally Anna Lundgren, Sustainability of USO in a Liberalized Postal Market,
in POSTAL AND DELIVERY SERVICES: PRICING, PRODUCTIVITY, REGULATION AND STRATEGY
75, 84 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2001) (finding that the USO has proven
to be sustainable in Sweden); Per Jonsson & Sten Selander, The “Real” Graveyard Spiral:
Experiences from the Liberalized Swedish Postal Market, in PROGRESS TOWARD
LIBERALIZATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR 359, 359 (Michael A. Crew & Paul
R. Kleindorfer eds., 2006) (observing that Sweden’s liberalized postal service has not led to a
“graveyard spiral” as predicted by Crew and Kleindorfer).
167. The calculation of break-even costs for the USO is difficult. See generally, e.g.,
Philippe Choné, Laurent Flochel & Anne Perrot, Allocating and Funding Universal Service
Obligations in a Competitive Market, 20 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1247 (2000); John C. Panzar,
Funding Universal Service Obligations: The Costs of Liberalization, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN
POSTAL REFORM 101, 101 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2001) (arguing that
any analysis of the cost of a USO must first give careful consideration to an “unsubsidized
market scenario”).
168. OECD, PROMOTING COMPETITION IN POSTAL SERVICES, DAFFE/CLP(99)22
(1999).
169. D. Daniel Sokol, Express Delivery and the Postal Sector in the Context of Public Sector
Anti-Competitive Practices, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 353, 370 (2003).
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to use government to erect competitive restraints to the benefit of
the SOE. This theoretical claim has support from a number of
empirical studies.170 Similarly, the government as regulator may
provide preferences to its own SOEs as market participants.171
Furthermore, where the state is both a market participant and
regulator, there is little incentive for a postal incumbent to adopt
new technologies. Indeed, the postal incumbent may try to block
innovations if they were to facilitate new entry.172 In the U.S.
context, the USPS attempted to expand its reach to electronic
services in the early 1980s in order to regulate the precursor to the
internet. The USPS took steps that could have resulted in e-mail
falling within the postal reserve monopoly.173 Only FTC competition
advocacy prevented such an outcome.174 If left to itself, a postal
incumbent will attempt to increase the scope of its reserved area and
its mandate, and engage in cross-subsidization in express delivery
services.175
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POSTAL SOES
This Part provides a descriptive cross-country analysis of SOE
corporate governance of postal SOEs. It highlights the main features
of SOE laws and of postal-specific laws in the countries studied. The
purpose of this series of case studies is to illustrate the various
permutations that laws take in addressing SOE corporate
170. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 199; R. Richard Geddes, Pricing by StateOwned Enterprises: The Case of Postal Services, 29 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 575, 587
(2008) (theorizing that SOEs will raise prices in inelastic markets if profits are weighted
positively).
171. See generally Geoff Edwards & Leonard Waverman, The Effects of Public Ownership
and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes, 29 J. REG. ECON. 23, 51 (2006)
(finding that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of SOEs).
172. Edward M. Graham, Approaches to Competition Policy, in TRADE RULES IN THE
MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 423 (Miguel
Rodriguez Mendoza et al. eds., 1999). SOEs also have an incentive to utilize inefficient
technology to realize incremental costs lower than competitors in the unregulated market. The
greater the technological inefficiency, the greater the revenue maximization from expanded
output. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 195; see also Timothy Brennan, Entry and
Welfare Loss in Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF UTILITIES
147 (Michael Crew ed., 1990) (arguing that SOEs may use wasteful spending on R&D as a
deterrent to new entrants).
173. JOHN C. HILKE, IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPETITION POLICY
AND SECTORAL REGULATION ¶ 46 (2006).
174. Id.
175. GEDDES, supra note 163, at 1.
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governance. This Part does not examine the very sparse case law
underlying these laws. Rather, it analyzes the laws on the books to
understand how the laws address the theoretical distinctions between
public and private ownership.176 Legal origins do not explain the
corporate governance of SOEs.
All countries have transparency provisions and board-level
governance provisions. On paper it would seem, therefore, that all
SOEs should have good governance mechanisms. However, the
amount of transparency varies across countries (not all provide the
same level of transparency as those firms that are publicly traded on
the local stock market). Moreover, not all governance is the same. In
some SOE laws there is a provision for profit maximization and
board selection reflects this goal. In other countries, board selection
rewards political favorites, rather than those with management
experience. In some countries, such as Korea, the postal SOE is
directly a part of government and has not been corporatized.
A. Chile
The Sistema de Empresas Publicas (SEP) that oversees Correos
Chile sets up a model of corporative governance to attempt efficient
and transparent oversight. SEP requires Chilean SOEs to make
information regarding its management publicly available. To do so,
Chilean SOEs must submit their financial records to external audits.
To reduce the possibility of self-dealing, the SEP prohibits board
members from undertaking business decisions that would affect a
board member’s personal interests.177 It also places limitations on the
method of financing for the SEP companies.178 The SEP does not
contain discussion of an efficiency rationale nor does it address issues
of soft budget constraints.
Unless otherwise specifically provided in company by-laws the
Ley de Sociedades Anónimas (Corporations Act) applies only to such
SEP-managed companies organized as “sociedades anónimas” (e.g.,
Metro S.A., Zofri S.A., Essbio S.A., Aguas Andinas S.A., etc.). Many
SEP-managed companies were created by law or by a decree with
force of law (decreto con fuerza de ley) and as such, they have a special

176. A study of the law as practiced would be helpful but is not possible given the paucity
of cases.
177. SEP art. 8.
178. Id. at art. 12.

1754

DO NOT DELETE

1713

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

Competition Policy

legal status. This law does not apply to Correos Chile. Article 1 of
DFL 10/1982 that created Empresa de Correos de Chile provides:
Créase una persona jurídica de derecho público que se denominará
“Empresa de Correos de Chile.” La Empresa de Correos de Chile
será un organismo de administración autónoma del Estado, con
patrimonio propio, que estará sujeta a la fiscalización de la
Contraloría General de la República. Se regirá por las disposiciones
del presente decreto con fuerza de ley y sus reglamentos y, en lo no
previsto en ellos, por la legislación común.179

Considering the last sentence, some may argue that the Corporations
Act would apply to Correos. However a more accurate reading of
“legislación común” would be to make reference to the Civil Code
and other laws of general applicability.
Directors of Chilean SOEs must follow rules based on substance
and procedure of the Law of Joint-Stock Companies and Law of
Administrative Probity. Under these laws, directors have a duty of
conduct, loyalty, and honesty. The Law of Administrative Integrity
establishes the mechanisms for disqualifying a company’s directors,
as well as requires directors to provide disclosure of potential
conflicts of interest.180
The Chilean Postal Law provides additional guidance concerning
corporate governance.181 The law includes provisions on the role of
the board of directors and restrictions to prevent self dealing. This
includes barring members of political parties and unions that have
related interests with Correos from board positions.182 There is no
discussion in the law of how to prevent cross-subsidization from the
monopoly business to competitive related businesses.

179. Unofficial translation: A legal person of public right is created that will denominate
“Company of the Post Office of Chile.” The Company of the Post Office of Chile will be an
organ of independent administration of the State, with its own patrimony, that will be subject
to the control of the General Contraloría of the Republic. It will be in force by the dispositions
of the present decree with force of law and its regulations and, those not anticipated in them,
by the common legislation.
180. Ley 19.653 – Probidad Administrativa (Law of Administrative Probity (Integrity)):
Article 1 (7) specifies the justifications for transparency in administrative procedures. Similarly,
Ley 19.880 – Procedimiento Administrativo (Law of Administrative Process), discusses how
administrative procedures are to be carried out, including the principles that guide
administrative actions (transparency, expediency, and efficiency) and the rights of the public.
181. DFL 10, 30–01–1982 as amended by DFL 22, 02–09–2003, available at https://
www.correos.cl/empresa/documentos.php.
182. Id. at art. 8.
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B. New Zealand
The State-Owned Enterprises Act183 (“SOEA”) governs SOEs
(called “Crown Companies”) in New Zealand. Under Section 4 of
the Act, the principal objective of an SOE is to be as profitable as
comparable businesses that are not state owned. This calls into
question the need for SOEs in the first place. The answer to this
Section is that the SOE legislation was created as part of a staged
privatization.184 It was seen as a nod to public opposition to have a
special statute, rather than to utilize the Companies Act.185 Including
express language of “good employer” and “social responsibility” in
Section 4 added just enough differentiation from firms governed by
the Companies Act to be politically palatable. While these are barely
justiciable objects, they are greater than the requirements of the
Companies Act; being a good employer and acting with social
responsibility are not express objects of ordinary companies. While
there is nothing in the Companies Act to prevent directors from
acting as good employers and with social responsibility, there are no
affirmative duties as such to do that. Collectively, the New Zealand
SOE regulatory system creates a system with requirements as close to
that of private firms as possible. To the extent that governance affects
performance, it should be the case that the performance of New
Zealand Post should be among the best performing postal SOEs.
The SOEA provides a number of transparency provisions. SOEA
Section 14 provides that SOEs must deliver a statement of corporate
intent to shareholders,186 whereas SOEA Section 15 mandates that
SOE deliver annual reports, statements of accounts, and dividends.187
Under SOEA Section 18, shareholders can make requests of other
information.188 Sector regulation also mandates transparency.
Crown Company board duties in New Zealand enumerate the
expectation of ownership by the state including the ability to
monitor senior management (e.g., the CEO), undertake compliance
183. Available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1986/0124/latest/
DLM97377.html.
184. Graham Scott, After the Reforms: Some Questions about the State of the State in
New Zealand, 4 PUB. Q., June 2008, at 3, 6.
185. Companies Act 1993, 1993 Public Act No. 105 (N.Z.).
186. State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 1986 Public Act No. 124 § 14(1) (as at 01 Apr.
2008) (N.Z.).
187. Id. § 15.
188. Id. § 18.
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with statutes, increase shareholder value, and create appropriate
governance structures.189 New Zealand SOEs must also provide
Statements of Corporate Intent (“SCI”). New Zealand Post provides
a three year set of plans as part of this SCI. For example, in the SCI
that covers 2007-2010, New Zealand Post announced that it will
seek to keep its postal business profitable, grow its Kiwibank
subsidiary, and increase the profitability of its express services
business.190 The SCI provides statistical performance targets for New
Zealand Post for the three years. A special Crown Companies
Monitoring Advisory Unit monitors the corporate governance and
performance of SOEs.191
Board-level governance under the SOEA provides that as
representatives of the government, ministers can hold shares in an
SOE.192 This grants Ministers the power to request information. The
SOEA provides for management oversight by the board through
directorships. The SOEA defines the role of the director as a person
who will help SOEs achieve their principal objectives.193 There is
some specificity as to what these goals are. Moreover, the SOEA
creates an arms-length relationship in terms of oversight between
government and NZP by distancing management tasks from political
control.
A sector-specific regulatory framework also applies to New
Zealand Post. The Postal Services Act of New Zealand (“PSA NZ”)
removed the New Zealand Post’s delivery monopoly on standard
letters.194 This sector liberalization has increased competition and it
may be that the corporatized structure of New Zealand Post is a
reflection of the need for better governance due to the threat of
greater competition. So long as a company is registered with the
189. CROWN COMPANY MONITORING ADVISORY UNIT, OWNER’S EXPECTATION
MANUAL FOR STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES § 8 (2007).
190. NEW ZEALAND POST LIMITED, STATEMENT OF CORPORATE INTENT 1 (2007),
available at https://www.nzpost.co.nz/NZPost/Images/NZPost/PDF/2007StatementOf
CorporateIntent.pdf.
191. The specific functions of this unit include: ownership environment management,
performance monitoring, issue management, and governance. See generally CROWN COMPANY
MONITORING ADVISORY UNIT, STATEMENT OF INTENT (2008), available at
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/abouttreasury/soi/2008-13/09.htm.
192. State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 1986 Public Act No. 124 § 10 (as at 01 Apr.
2008) (N.Z.).
193. Id. § 5.
194. See Postal Services Act 1998, Public Act 1998 No. 2 § 29 (N.Z.), available at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1998/0002/latest/DLM423258.html.
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Ministry of Economic Development, it can deliver mail. PSA NZ
allows for the Governor-General to create regulations to require a
postal operator to provide information on accounting and
compliance.195 Specifically, PSA NZ requires that postal providers
disclose information that relates to service, such as price, frequency
of service, quantity of service, and quality of service. For example,
PSA Section 55 requires that regulated firms submit information,
reports, etc., to the regulator to monitor the efficiency and quality of
postal services that firms provide.196 The Act also requires disclosure
of financial statements including profit and loss statements and
balance sheets.197
C. United Kingdom
The Postal Services Act of 2000 (“PSA UK”) established the
Postal Services Commission (Postcomm).198 The Act requires
universal postal service at a uniform price throughout the UK and
promotes competition among providers. Postcomm regulates Royal
Mail (the SOE) through a number of different mechanisms.
Postcomm sets quality of service standards and imposes financial
penalties for failing to meet those standards. Postcomm sets the
framework for Royal Mail’s prices (with an aim to reach efficiency in
service standards and to reduce barriers to entry for other market
participants) and intervenes in situations in which Royal Mail does
not offer access to its network.
As part of transparency, the Act requires that postal firms send
copies of annual audited accounts to the Secretary of State.199 PSA
UK also requires that postal companies make information available
upon request to the Treasury regarding public sector finance
issues.200 It also mandates that the Commission exercise oversight
functions to promote more effective competition.201 To protect
against anti-competitive conduct by postal providers, Postcomm has

195. Id. § 60.
196. Id. § 55.
197. Id. § 60.
198. Postal Services Act, 2000, c. 26, Part 1, § 1 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000026_en_1.htm.
199. Id. § 77.
200. Id. § 78.
201. Id. § 5.
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investigation powers to oversee conduct.202 Along with investigatory
powers, Postcomm has the ability to impose financial penalties for
violations of license conditions.203 PSA UK assigns such penalties
based on a reasonableness standard, with a maximum penalty of 10
percent of the turnover of the postal license holder.204 Because of
concurrent regulation, the Competition Commission can overrule
any Postcomm decision that the Competition Commission believes
to be anti-competitive.205 Royal Mail provides an annual report
including financial details of performance and information about its
senior leadership.206
Royal Mail is a public limited company (PLC), which means that
the Companies Act governs Royal Mail. The Companies Act imposes
certain obligations upon directors. They include the submission of a
director’s remuneration report, a duty of loyalty to the company, a
duty to exercise independent judgment, board authorization, and
ratification.207 Listing rules create specific procedural requirements to
ensure transparency and information flow from listed companies.208
Because of the involvement of a number of different regulators
(Treasury, Postcomm, Competition Commission) there are fewer
opportunities for all regulators to be captured by Royal Mail, as
might be the case with a single regulator that oversees all financial
and regulatory functions.209 The various UK governance mechanisms
make SOEs, including Royal Post, accountable in ways similar to
private firms. The quality of governance should be good relative to
other countries’ postal SOEs, particularly given increased
liberalization within the postal sector.
European postal regulation adds another regulatory dimension to
accountability and transparency of postal providers in the UK and
other EU Member States. Under the European Community Postal
Directive, tariffs applied to the universal service are to be “objective,
202. Id. § 57.
203. Id. § 30–36.
204. Id. § 30.
205. See
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/what_investigate/
index.htm.
206. The Shareholder Executive Annual Report 2007–08, available at http://www.
shareholderexecutive.gov.uk/publications/pdf/annualreport0708.pdf.
207. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 170–77 (Eng.).
208. See, e.g., United Kingdom Listing Authority Listing Rules § 7.2.1R (Jan. 2005).
209. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971) (explaining capture).
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transparent, non-discriminatory and geared to costs.”210 Any postal
provider with universal service obligation needs to create an
independently verifiable cost accounting system.211 This system must
provide transparency in accuracy of cost allocation.212 Further EU
Postal directives articulate with more specificity the nature of
transparency and costs:
[P]roportionality . . . should continue to be applied to any
financing mechanism and any decision in this area should be based
on transparent, objective and verifiable criteria. In particular, the
net cost of the universal service should be calculated, under the
supervision of the national regulatory authority, as the difference
between the net costs of a designated universal service provider
operating under a universal service obligation and not operating
under a universal service obligation. The calculation should take
into account all other relevant elements, including any market
benefits which accrue to a postal service provider designated to
provide universal service, the entitlement to a reasonable profit and
incentives for cost efficiency.213

In addition to transparency and proportionality, the EC Postal
Directive increases the scope for potential competition by opening
competition within the postal sector.214 This includes a narrowing of
the weight limit of postal services that can be reserved as part of the
postal monopoly, as well as price limits.215
D. Sweden
The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (“SCCG”) is a
non-binding set of recommendations to improve corporate
governance for stock market companies and some SOEs, including
the postal provider Posten.216 The SCCG suggests that corporate
board provide annual financial reports, stock exchange reports,

210. Directive 97/67/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 15) 26.
211. Id. at 29.
212. Id.
213. Directive 2008/6/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 52) 29 (amending Directive 97/67/EC 1998
O.J. (L 52) 7).
214. Directive 2002/39/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 176) 21.
215. Id. at 16–18.
216. Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (A Proposal by the Code Group), art. I, §
1.2 (Apr. 21, 2004), available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4089/a/26296.
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reports on corporate governance and internal controls.217 The SCCG
also suggests mechanisms for internal control.218
Article III, Sections 3.5.1–.6 of the SCCG address board
procedures. These sections require that firms must provide annual,
clear, formal work plans and include standard procedures such as the
establishment of special committees, and evaluations of the
performance of managers.219 The Division for State Enterprises of
the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications applies
uniform structures for SOE board nomination processes.220 This
includes an analysis of the SOE’s current board composition and the
identified needs that new board members should fill.221 Because
actual needs drive the board nomination process, the quality of
board members seems to be better than those of SOE board
members in other countries (at least in postal), merely based on
biographical sketches provided of board members of other countries
studied for this Article. The postal regulator is the Swedish Post and
Telecom Agency. It ensures that postal operators such as Posten
meet their license conditions. Since 1994, Posten is structured as a
100 percent state-owned limited liability company.222
In Sweden, “‘Board members have the same unlimited
responsibility as board members of privately-owned companies.’”223
Swedish SOEs hold annual meetings, which are open to the general
public.224 Like other Swedish companies, SOEs must submit an
annual report regarding the board’s work in the previous year.225
Transparency is not merely an issue of corporate governance, but of
transparency of government more generally: “For state-owned
companies, the requirement for an open and professional provision

217. Id. at art. III, §§ 3.5–8.
218. Id. at art. III, § 3.7.
219. Id. at art. III, §§ 3.5.1–6.
220. Maria Vagliasindi, The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises
in Developing Countries, 9 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4579, 2008).
221. Id.
222. In Sweden, the regulatory situation becomes more difficult when Posten mergers
with Post Denmark, in which both governments will hold joint ownership and, presumably,
joint regulatory oversight.
223. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF
OECD COUNTRIES 138 (2005) (quoting Aktiebolagslag [ABL] [Swedish Company Act]
1975:1385 (Swed.)).
224. Id. at 102.
225. Id. at 100.
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of information transparency is a question of democracy since the
companies are ultimately owned by the Swedish people.”226 For this
reason, the government of Sweden has, since 1999, published an
annual report for SOEs.227 The Annual Report of State-Owned
Companies reveals publicly the balance sheet, income statement,
cash flow and other financial information of Posten.228 The Report
also announces a profitability target (“10 percent of net profit in
relation to average shareholder’s equity”).229 If SOEs have a
governance structure and set of duties and reporting requirements
similar to private firms, one must ask why have them state-owned at
all, at least in those industries that can be competitive. As with New
Zealand, corporate governance that is very similar to private firms
suggests that Swedish SOEs and Swedish Post as a case study should
have among the best governance and performance outcomes of
postal SOEs.
E. South Africa
In South Africa, SOEs are subject to the same legislation as
privately owned companies, such as the Companies Act.230 Under
Section 33 of the Companies Act, companies must file an annual
transparency and accountability report.231 This entails submitting
yearly financial statements.232 The current Companies Act is general
legislation regulating companies but does not distinguish between
state-owned and other companies.233 The new Companies Bill of
2008 does make the distinction between state-owned and other
companies but no distinction is made in the context of corporategovernance rules.234 For example, the Bill codifies fiduciary duties—
duty of loyalty and duty of care.235 These duties, however, apply to

226. Id. at 98 (quoting Annual Report State-Owned Companies 2003, (Regeringskansliet,
Sweden), June 2004 at 17).
227. Annual Report State-Owned Companies 2007, (Regeringskansliet, Sweden), Oct.
2008, at 11.
228. See id. at 66.
229. Id. at 68.
230. Companies Act 61 of 1973.
231. Id. at § 33.
232. Id.
233. See id. §§ 2, 19.
234. Compare Companies Bill, 2008, Bill 61-2008 (GG), § 9, with part F.
235. Id. § 76.
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all companies.236 In practice, the duties might not always be the
same.
The Postal Services Act237 provides that there must be fair
competition within the postal industry. South Africa Post may have a
business rationale other than profit. Supporting the lack of profit
rationale for South Africa Post is explicit language in the Postal Act
that grants a possible yearly subsidy for South Africa Post.238
According to the Postal Industry Code of Practice, postal operators
cannot engage in unfair pricing.239 However, this does not seem to
refer to predatory pricing. Rather it refers to price discrimination.
The postal regulator must regulate to provide “equal access for all
citizens.”240 Among the other mandates under the Postal Act is to
promote stability.241 Such functions make it more difficult for postal
operators to pursue a profit strategy.242 Indeed, the law explicitly
provides for annual subsidies to postal providers.243 Though the
subsidies must be on specific terms, there is no policing function
enumerated in the law to prevent a postal company from anticompetitive cross-subsidization.
In terms of transparency, the King II Report on Corporate
Governance mandates formal and transparent procedures for board
of director nominations.244 Other parts of the Report focus on such
corporate governance issues as reporting, accounting and auditing,
and compliance and enforcement. South Africa Post uses an
independent auditor for a review of its financials.245
Overall corporate governance provisions for SOEs and for South
Africa Post are weaker than in other countries that have standards
akin to those of private firms. For political reasons, South Africa has
236. Id.
237. Postal Services Act 124 of 1998.
238. Id. § 29.
239. POST OFFICE, CODE OF PRACTICE (FOR SOUTH AFRICAN POSTAL INDUSTRY),
available at http://www.sapo.co.za/Documents/Code%20of%20Practice%20FINAL.pdf.
240. Postal Services Act, § 8.
241. Id. § 2(k).
242. See id. § 8(1)(f).
243. Id. § 29(1).
244. KING COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
KING REPORT 2002, 23 ¶ 2.2.2, available at http://www.nfcgindia.org/kingcommittee
2002.htm.
245. Most recently, the external auditor was KMPG. See POST OFFICE, SOUTH AFRICAN
POST OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT 2007, 34–35, available at http://www.sapo.co.za/AboutUs/
Post%20Office%20AR%20ACC_36432.pdf.
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chosen to maintain a soft budget constraint, and this should affect
the overall governance of SOEs.
F. Canada
The Canada Post Corporation Act transformed the Canadian
Post Office Department into a government owned corporation
(Crown Corporation) in 1981.246 Sections 151 and 152 of the
Financial Administration Act of 1984 mandate an annual report to
parliament on the status of Crown Corporations.247 This report
provides a brief summary of each of the Canadian SOEs, including
Canada Post.248 Auditing of Canada Post occurs both from a
government auditor (Auditor General of Canada) and an outside
auditor (KPMG).249 Canada Post produces an annual report that
includes consolidated financial statements.250 Nevertheless,
government reports suggest that there are problems in the corporate
governance of Canadian SOEs.251
To ensure the quality of oversight and decision-making of the
board, the board of Canada Post undertakes regular self-assessment
surveys. There is a specific corporate governance committee for the
board. Criteria for joining the board suggest that members hold
certain skills. A review of the current board shows that board
members have a number of different backgrounds that potentially
could bring value to the board. Moreover, the board process is a
continuous one in that there are opportunities for board members to
receive additional training opportunities to improve the skills of
board members.252
The Canada Post Corporation Act specifies goals about service
but does not establish an efficiency goal.253 However, Canada Post is
required to earn a “reasonable” rate of return on equity in a
246. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C 10, §§ 1–34 (1985).
247. Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., ch. F 10, §§ 151–52 (1984).
248. See, e.g., TREASURY BOARD OF CANADA SECRETARIAT, CROWN CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER CORPORATE INTERESTS OF CANADA 2007, § 2.4, available at http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/reports-rapports/cc-se/2007/cc-setb-eng.asp.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Canada Post, 2007 Annual Report 86–122, available at http://www.
canadapost.ca/corporate/about/annual_report/pdf/en/Full_ARs/AR_2007_Eng.pdf.
251. See OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, 2000 DEC. REPORT ch. 18,
cited in OECD, supra note 223, at 97.
252. Id.
253. See Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C 10, § 5 (1985).

1764

DO NOT DELETE

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

1713

Competition Policy

“commercial” environment, which suggests a profit motive of some
sort.254 The Act provides typical rules about who can serve as
members of the board of directors and the length of time of
service.255 Nevertheless, there are no provisions that explicitly address
the potential for anti-competitive cross subsidization.256 Academic
work suggests that Canada Post remains relatively inefficient.
Competitors complain, for example, of various government-created
barriers to entry.257
Canada Post is a case of a firm that is corporatized but not to the
extent of SOEs in Sweden or New Zealand. Because of its monopoly
position and state ownership, it takes advantage of a soft budget
constraint.258 This permits Canada Post to create regulatory barriers
to entry and to otherwise raise the costs of its rivals.
G. Korea
There are three different types of SOEs in Korea: Government
Enterprises, Government-Invested Enterprises, and GovernmentFunded Enterprises. Korea Post is a Government Enterprise, which
means that it is a government entity (unlike the other forms of
SOE), and the government runs Korea Post like any other
government department under Korea’s Ministry of Knowledge
Economy. This status means that Korea Post lacks managerial
autonomy that other SOE forms provide. The general regulation
over enterprises under governmental control is based upon the “Act
254. CANADA POST CORPORATION STRATEGIC REVIEW SECRETARIAT, CONSULTATION
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, § 4.a.4 (2008), available at http://www.cpcstrategicreviewexamenstrategiquescp.gc.ca/CGD-eng.PDF.
255. See Canada Post Corporation Act, § 6.
256. Because of the lack of a domestic solution, these issues came to play in a NAFTA
arbitration claim brought by UPS Canada against Canada Post. Although UPS Canada made a
number of claims about unfair competition, essentially arguing anti-competitive cross
subsidization from the postal reserve to the express delivery sector, the NAFTA tribunal ruled
in favor of Canada Post primarily on the grounds of Canada Post operating based on
commercial, rather than government, interest. The decision made a number of assumptions on
government decision-making that were not accurate, as the dissent by Ron Cass pointed out.
See United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada, International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Award on the Merits for an Arbitration under Chapter 11
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (June 11, 2007), available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/
MeritsAward24May2007.pdf.
257. Edward M. Iacobucci, Michael J. Trebilcock & Tracey D. Epps, Rerouting the Mail:
Why Canada Post is Due for Reform, 243 C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT. 1, 17–19 (2007).
258. Id. at 19–22.
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on the Management of Public Agencies.” A corporation in which the
Korean government has more than 50 percent equity is subject to
the Act. Regulations under the Act include appointment and
dismissal of the board members, disclosure, and monitoring/audit of
the corporation. The government also provides detailed rules on
accounting.
In some sense, Korea Post board functions include many of the
functions typical of private firms. Such functions include, for
example, acquisitions of assets and operational duties involving
budget, finance, and operations.259 Korea Post publishes an annual
report that contains balance sheet information and other information
regarding the strategy of Korea Post, including metrics.260
Under the Postal Service Act, the Minister of Information and
Communication oversees the organization for the delivery of mail
across the country.261 Transparency provisions are not listed.
Moreover, there are no explicit safeguards against anti-competitive
conduct.
Korea recently enacted a Special Law on the Governance of
Korea Post.262 Some sections of the Act address the issue of the
effectiveness of management, including sections on management
autonomy and the creation of an evaluative oversight committee
within the Ministry of Knowledge Economy to ensure that Korea
Post is run effectively.263 Oversight duties of this committee within
the government include standard board functions such as oversight
of financial affairs and management results.264 To ensure transparency
and accountability, the findings of the committee must be published.
Similarly, to address issues of internal control, the head of Korea
Post must develop an annual management plan for approval of the
Ministry of Knowledge Economy with objective criteria for
measuring the success of Korea Post.265 The lack of corporatization
259. OECD, supra note 223, at 139, table 6.4 (citing Framework Act on the
Management of Government-Invested Institutions (as amended Jan. 28, 2000), art. 9
(Korea)).
260. See, e.g., KOREA POST, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, available at http://www.
koreapost.go.kr/eng/news/annual_report.jsp.
261. Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions (as
amended Jan. 28, 2000), art. 2 (Korea).
262. Enacted Jan. 30, 2009.
263. Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions, art. 3–4.
264. Id. at art. 5(a).
265. Id. at art. 6(a).

1766

DO NOT DELETE

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

1713

Competition Policy

suggests that a soft budget constraint limits the effectiveness of
corporate governance provisions.
H. Japan
The Japanese government “privatized” Japan Post in October
2007. In fact, what occurred was a corporatization of Japan Post
rather than a privatization. This is seen as a first step to eventual
privatization.266
Japan Post Group is comprised of five corporations: Japan Post
Holdings Co., Ltd. (“Holdings”), Japan Post Network Co., Ltd.
(“Network”), Japan Post Service Co., Ltd. (“Service”), Japan Post
Bank Co., Ltd. (“Bank”), and Japan Post Insurance Co., Ltd.
(“Insurance”). Holdings is the holding company and sole
shareholder (100%) of the other four corporations. The Minister of
Finance is the sole shareholder (100%) of Holdings. Network
provides customer services in postal, banking, and insurance
operations commissioned by Service, Bank, and Insurance. It
maintains 24,000 post offices. Service engages in postal services,
including domestic and international mail. Bank, as its name
suggests, engages in banking services. Likewise, Insurance provides
life insurance. It has its own outlets, but primarily provides its
services through Network’s post offices.
Holdings has adopted the “Committee System” under the
Companies Act, which requires a Nomination Committee, Audit
Committee, and Compensation Committee within its Board of
Directors.267 From the standpoint of board independence, a majority
of committee members must be appointed from among the outside
directors. In terms of oversight over directors and management, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications consults with the
Ministry of Finance when approving matters provided under the
Japan Post Holdings Corporation Act. This includes provisions such
as Section 8(1) (solicitation of subscribers of share for subscription
or share option for subscription, or delivery of share or share option
in share exchange), Section 10 (annual business plan), and Section

266. See Japanese Government-sponsored study, “The Committee on Japan Post
Privatization,” (determining how to proceed with the liberalization of Japan Post), available at
http://www.yuseimineika.go.jp/iinkai/dai51/51gijisidai.html (Japanese).
267. Companies Act of Japan § 2(12). Unofficial English version available at http://
www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CA1_4_2.pdf.
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11 (amendment of the corporate charter, dividend, a merger, a
company split, and a dissolution of the corporate).268
Regarding transparency, Holdings and Service must submit their
balance sheets, profit and loss statements, and business reports
within three months after the end of the business year to the
Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications.269 The
Corporations law requires an annual meeting. Under this law,
Holdings and Service must provide public notice of the balance sheet
and profit and loss statement after the conclusion of the annual
shareholders meeting.270 Balance sheets, profit and loss statements,
and business reports are not made public. Of course, private
corporations are not required to make such documents public, but
Japan Post, though “privatized,” is not yet a private corporation. As
it still has universal service obligations, elements of Japan Post enjoy
the benefits afforded a government monopoly but does not incur the
obligations to make public its internal financial policies and practices,
nor is it obligated to make transparent the process that governs the
approval process required when Japan Post enters new business
ventures. In other words, the processes referred to above are
transparent only for those within The Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications and Japan Post.
The duties of directors in terms of duties of care271 and loyalty
are the same as for private corporations under the Corporate Act.
However, there is no explicit mandate to operate differently than
publicly traded firms (i.e., to maximize profits). Rather, the only
mandate on the Postal Act is for Service to maintain universal postal
service.272 These statutory requirements make Japan Post behave
more like private firms. However, unlike New Zealand, there is no
explicit limit to the soft budget constraint.
I. United States
The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (the “Act”)
provides the structure of government oversight of the U.S. Postal
Service (“USPS”) in the United States. Corporate law is a hybrid of
268. Japan Post Holdings Corporation Act § 16.
269. Japan Post Holdings Corporation Act § 12; Japan Post Service Corporation Act §
10.
270. Companies Act of Japan § 440.
271. Corporate Act of Japan § 330; Civil Code of Japan § 644.
272. Postal Act of Japan § 70.
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state and federal law.273 Federal SOEs do not have to incorporate
under state incorporation laws. Because of the lack of state
incorporation, corporate governance of SOEs is distinct from that of
private firms.
The Act was a significant transformation for postal regulation in
the United States. To solve the problem of the USPS not being a
profit maximizing entity, the Act made explicit the need to push for
greater efficiency. Along these lines, the Act treats the USPS more
like private firms. To provide for disclosure like private corporations,
the USPS needs to file quarterly reports containing the information
that the SEC requires under the 1934 Act274 for 10-Qs275 with the
Postal Regulatory Commission. Similarly, the USPS must file
information that the SEC requires in annual reports for 10-Ks and 8Ks with the Postal Regulatory Commission.276 It also must comply
with Sarbanes Oxley requirements and provide detailed financial
reporting.277
If on the books the USPS looks like a private firm, in practice
these similarities begin to vanish. USPS Board members are not
individuals with significant private sector experience, especially not in
large and sophisticated logistics, distribution, supply chain
management, or regulated industries. Some have previous experience
with the postal service, but none would have the skill set or
connections one would want on the board of a private competitor
such as UPS or Fed Ex. It is a warning sign about the quality of
governance that over half of the USPS board members are politically
connected lawyers and other operatives. The following chart
illustrates the difference in the quality of board composition between
USPS and its competitors among independent directors. Not
surprisingly, when there is greater accountability to shareholders
because of profit concerns, there are higher quality members of the
board (as is the case with UPS and Fed Ex).

273. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (2009).
274. 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78o(d) (2006).
275. 39 U.S.C. § 3654(a)(1)(A) (2006).
276. Id. § 3654(a)(1)(B) & (C).
277. Id. § 3654(a)(2); id. §3654(a)(3)(B).
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CHART 1: OUTSIDE DIRECTORS COMPARISON
USPS

UPS

Carolyn Lewis Gallagher
(former CEO of Texwood
Furniture)

Duane Ackerman (former
Chairman, BellSouth)

Louis J. Giuliano (former
CEO of ITT)

James C. Miller III (former
senior government official)

Michael J. Burns (former
Chairman and CEO, Dana
Corporation)
Stuart E. Eizenstat (lawyer,
former senior government
official)
Michael L. Eskew (former
chairman and CEO, UPS)
William R. Johnson
(Chairman and CEO, H.J.
Heinz)
Ann M. Livermore (Exec.
VP, Hewlett-Packard)

Ellen C. Williams (lobbyist,
former government official)

Rudy Markham (former
CFO, Unilever)

Mickey D. Barnett (lawyer)

James H. Bilbray (lawyer
and former Congressman)
Thurgood Marshall, Jr.
(lawyer)

John W. Thompson (former
CEO, Symantec)
Carol Tome (CFO, Home
Depot)

Fed Ex
James L. Barksdale
(Chairman and President,
Barksdale Management
Corporation)
John A. Edwardson
(Chairman and CEO,
CDW Corporation)
Judith L. Estrin (CEO
JLABS, LLC)
J.R. Hyde III (Chairman
GTx, Inc.)
Shirley A. Jackson
(President, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute)
Steven R. Loranger
(Chairman and CEO,
ITT Corporation)
Gary W. Loveman
(Chairman and CEO,
Harrah’s Entertainment)
Susan C. Schwab (former
senior government official)
Joshua I. Smith (Chairman
and Managing Partner,
Coaching Group, LLC)
David P. Steiner (CEO,
Waste Management)
Paul S. Walsh (CEO,
Diageo)

Historically there has been a problem of an ineffective regulator
of the postal service. Empirical evidence shows that anti-competitive
cross-subsidization occurred under the old postal regulatory
regime.278 The old regulator, the Postal Rate Commission, was an
inadequate regulator that could not adequately check on anticompetitive practices of the USPS. The old Postal Rate Commission
lacked the subpoena power over the USPS and the ability to
mandate that the USPS provide it with data; whatever data the
Commission received came voluntarily from the USPS.279 This
278. See generally Geddes, supra note 170, at 575.
279. See R. Richard Geddes, Reform of the U.S. Postal Service, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 217,
219 (2005).
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differed from most other U.S. federal agencies at the time. More
importantly, the lack of subpoena power created information
asymmetries between the USPS and its regulator, which the USPS
could and did exploit to limit competition.280 The new Act corrects a
number of these deficiencies. There is now the authority to issue
subpoenas.281 Anti-competitive cross-subsidization from the reserve
to the competitive sector is no longer permitted.282 As a result of the
Act, the USPS is subject to antitrust laws.283 This reflects a legislative
change as a response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in United States Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries discussed
below.284 One of the explicit goals of the new regulator, the Postal
Regulatory Commission, is “[t]o allocate the total institutional costs
of the Postal Service appropriately between market-dominant and
competitive products.”285 Appropriate cost allocation will reduce the
opportunity for the USPS to engage in anti-competitive crosssubsidization as it has done in the past. As part of this mandate, the
legal mandate is that “each class of mail or type of mail service bear
the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to each class or type
of mail service through reliably identified causal relationships plus
that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably
assignable to such class or type.”286 If followed, this type of cost
accounting would do much to protect against potential anticompetitive cross-subsidization. Moreover, the Act explicitly limits
this anti-competitive cross subsidy in terms of setting rates:
§ 3633. Provisions applicable to rates for competitive products
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Postal Regulatory Commission shall,
within 18 months after the date of enactment of this section,
promulgate (and may from time to time thereafter revise)
regulations to—
(1) prohibit the subsidization of competitive products by
market-dominant products;

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See supra note 236 (providing evidence of cross-subsidization).
39 U.S.C. § 504(f)(2)(A) (2006).
39 U.S.C § 3633(a) (2006).
39 U.S.C § 409(e)(1)(B) (2006).
540 U.S. 736 (2004).
39 U.S.C § 3622(b)(9) (2006).
Id. § 3622(c)(2).
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(2) ensure that each competitive product covers its costs
attributable; and
(3) ensure that all competitive products collectively cover what
the Commission determines to be an appropriate share of the
institutional costs of the Postal Service.287

These explicit prohibitions suggest governance mechanisms to solve
some of the worst competition problems. It is too early to tell
whether the law will prove effective, but on paper this is certainly an
improvement over the previous internal and external governance of
the USPS.
Competition concerns remain a problem. Like many countries,
the United States provides a statutory monopoly for mail. The USPS
has the ability to shape the definition of what can be included in the
protected sector through size and weight restrictions. The USPS has
a lower cost of capital than potential private firm competitors
because of government credit guarantees. Unlike private firms, the
USPS has the power of eminent domain and self zoning. This
suggests that soft budget constraints remain, even with the changes
under the Act.
An FTC report estimates that the value of government subsidies
that the USPS allocates to competitive products by virtue of its
government status to be in the range of $38 million to $113 million.
The various implicit subsidies include such categories as not having
to pay parking tickets or tolls.288 The FTC Report does not impute
some critical categories in terms of advantages for the postal service
in the competitive sector. For example, it does not impute the
reduced cost of capital due to what is effectively a U.S. government
guarantee that determines the USPS rate for debt.289 Moreover, the
report does not impute the value of the postal monopoly as one of
the benefits of the USPS.
This is not to suggest that there are not costs associated with
being the USPS. The FTC estimates that the current legal regime
imposed costs on the USPS of $213 to $743 million higher than
costs might be otherwise if it did not have these extra costs

287. 39 U.S.C § 3633(a).
288. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY
DIFFERENTLY TO THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS 57
(2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf.
289. Id. at 58.
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associated with its government mandate.290 These numbers only tell
part of the story as the FTC provides the disclaimer: “This range is
based only on estimates of those burdens and benefits that we have
been able to quantify.”291 However, the FTC does not seem to
adjust costs based on an accurate baseline. A firm that had a profit
maximizing mission would not be in the same situation as the USPS;
it would not have a bloated labor pool that would account for 80
percent of costs, which is out of line with other postal providers.292
Most importantly, the current USPS obligations under law exist
because of the lack of competition. The government has foreclosed
competition, which saddles the USPS with various regulatory
obligations that a more efficient competitor could provide. Injecting
competition and more market pressure to the U.S. Postal market
should lead to efficiency gains. Thus, an accounting of the implicit
subsidies would make the USPS a more efficient firm and force it to
behave more like a private firm. This would also require the USPS to
act more like a private firm in its corporate governance. A reduction
or elimination of the postal monopoly could be the impetus for a
transformative change at the USPS far more than what the Postal
Accountability Act has created. While it may be possible under
current U.S. law for a test that imputes these costs to determine the
true costs, the Postal Rate Commission has yet to devise it.293
V. COMPETITION AND SOES
Ex ante, the competition issues involving SOEs can be addressed
somewhat by corporate governance in terms of structuring the
incentives of a firm to behave more like private firms, with an
efficiency rationale. Without soft budget constraints, an SOE cannot
get away with predatory pricing so easily. Ex post, competitive
distortions can be solved through antitrust, which provides the
potential of relief against anti-competition abuses.
A. Incentives for SOE Anti-Competitive Behavior
Competition is the foundation for a market economy. Market
competition profoundly affects firms by eliminating inefficient
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 64 n.287.
Id. at 80.
39 U.S.C. § 3633 (2006).

1773

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

2009

firms.294 Moreover, it can make the monitoring of firms more
effective.295
Governments may erect many types of regulatory barriers to limit
competition.296 For example, bias by the government to protect
SOEs may take the form of favorable lending rates vis-à-vis private
firms. SOEs therefore may have a different cost of capital than do
private firms. This may have an effect of an implicit subsidy for
SOEs. Government may open its purse to provide for lower
borrowing rates than market rates. SOEs also may benefit from
discriminatory regulation. SOEs may not be required to pay taxes or
may be immune from antitrust. Moreover, SOEs may benefit from
information asymmetries. Information asymmetries occur where
SOEs have data that private competitors do not where the
government collects the data. An SOE can use its economies of
scope to create high barriers to entry that effectively forecloses
competition by efficient competitors.297 Because of cost structure and
incentives of an SOE, SOEs are more successful in their attempts to
prevent foreign entry than similarly situated private firms.298 This
Part will explain the postal competition issues present in antitrust
with the twist that the firms involved in potential anti-competitive
conduct are SOEs. Because of the soft budget constraint, SOEs do
not face the same sorts of costs that private firms do in an antitrust
inquiry. Thus, as this Part will demonstrate, it is possible for SOEs to
engage in predatory pricing without fear of antitrust liability based
on existing antitrust methodologies. Likewise, this Part will show
that it is possible for SOEs to engage in behavior that raises rivals’

294. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 211 (1950).
295. See generally Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as
Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14
BELL J. ECON. 21 (1983) (applying tournament theory of who to promote).
296. See Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path,
13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 101, 114 (2007); William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy
Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 361, 401
(2000); Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
165, 170 (2005).
297. John C. Panzar, Interactions Between Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in a
Liberalized Postal Sector, 5 (Northwestern Univ., Univ. of Auckland, Working Paper, 2008).
298. Anusha Chari & Nandini Gupta, Incumbents and Protectionism: The Political
Economy of Foreign Entry Liberalization, 88 J. FIN. ECON 633 (2008).
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costs with reduced risk of effective antitrust prosecution than
similarly situated private firms.
1. Revenue maximization as an SOE goal
Because of the soft budget constraint, SOEs may have goals
other than profit maximization such as revenue maximization.299
Government support of SOEs through government created
distortions (e.g., a large reserve sector, implicit loan guarantees,
preferences for zoning) allows SOEs to price below its marginal cost
due to the explicit and implicit subsidies that governments grant
SOEs and not their private competitors. This creates a situation,
unlike the typical U.S. antitrust predation case, which does not
require recoupment for successful SOE predation.300
In the postal context the concern is that the postal incumbent
can exclude based on an anti-competitive cross subsidy to the
competitive sector from the reserve sector and not have to recoup
costs because of the soft budget constraint. The ability of SOEs to
engage in non-recoupment predatory pricing poses an important
question. If consumers do not see higher prices as a result of the
predation, is there any consumer harm? When an SOE can pursue a
successful predation strategy, this reduces the resources of a
competitor to innovate or operate. The “but for” case is that there
might have been even lower prices and more innovation. Successful
predation also may have reputational effects if a firm competes in
multiple product markets. This reputational effect creates a credible
threat that allows firms to reap the benefits of predation even in
markets in which they did not predate. This in turn negatively affects
the overall market. Paul Milgrom explains:
Thus, for example, a firm in an industry with rapid product change
might cut prices sharply in answer to new entry in order to
discourage the new entrant from continuing an active product
development programme. Whether the entrant attributes its lack of
profitability to its high costs, to weak market demand, to
overcapacity in the industry, or to aggressive behaviour by its
299. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE? WHO SHOULD
COURTS BELIEVE? 77 (1999) (“[G]overnment enterprises also face higher returns from
below-cost pricing since they benefit not only from the long-term reduction in competition,
but also from the short-term increase in their output required to undertake the below-cost
pricing strategy.”).
300. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 522–23.
THE
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competitor, it will properly reduce its estimate of its future profits.
If its capital has other good uses, this might lead it to withdraw
from the industry. If not, it may nevertheless be dissuaded from
making new investments in and developing new products for the
industry. At the same time, other firms may be deterred from
entering the industry. If any of these things happen, the predator
benefits.301

When predator firms benefit, this reduces consumer
welfare.302 Predation must be distinguished from raising a rival’s
cost.303 Predation in non-SOE settings requires antitrust officials
to think about short run benefits versus long run costs. In raising
the cost of rivals, the goal is to increase the price of output for
rivals rather than decrease price. A successful raising of a rival’s
cost strategy would be one in which the dominant firm’s average
costs increase less than the incremental costs of a rival. This
allows a dominant firm to create an asymmetric impact on costs
relative to its rivals.304
The ultimate goal of raising a rival’s cost is different than
predation. A successful raising rival’s cost strategy does not require
the firm with higher costs to exit the market, but merely to allow the
dominant firm to raise its price above the competitive level.305 As
Sappington and Sidak suggest, “Consequently, even though an SOE
may value the profit that its anticompetitive activities can generate
less highly than does a private profit-maximizing firm, the SOE may
still find it optimal to pursue aggressively anticompetitive activities
that expand its own output and revenue.”306 Given that an SOE may
have revenue rather than revenue enhancement objectives, it can

301. Paul Milgrom, Predatory Pricing, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 937, 938 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987).
302. An increasing economic literature notes that predatory pricing may be rational in
other settings for profit maximizing firms as well. See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley &
Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239,
2241 (2000) (describing that “modern economic analysis has developed coherent theories of
predation that contravene earlier economic writing claiming that predatory pricing conduct is
irrational” and thus that “the consensus view in modern economics [is] that predatory pricing
can be a successful and fully rational business strategy”).
303. Deborah Cope, Regulating Market Activities in Public Sector, 7 OECD J.
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 32, 38–40 (2005); Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 496.
304. STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 244–46 (2d ed. 2002).
305. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 242 (1986).
306. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 499.
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more effectively absorb the cost of raising the costs than its private
rivals. It can do so because the government acts to constrain rival
firms.307 When an SOE can pursue an effective raising of a rival’s cost
strategy, it can expand its scope. Predation or raising rivals’ costs
takes away the ability for competitors to invest in increase research
and development and limits the ability to roll out new products and
services and processes that increase dynamic gains from
innovation.308 SOEs may have particular incentive to raise the costs
of its rivals. As the rival’s marginal cost increases, it may be costly to
the SOE, but it simultaneously increases the demand for the SOE’s
product or service. Since the SOE is a revenue maximizer, it benefits
from the increased demand.309
B. Antitrust Solution
Monopolization creates a consumer welfare loss. There are a
number of different cost based tests that antitrust law uses to combat
predatory pricing abuses.310 In some cases, an antitrust solution is
impossible because of a direct antitrust immunity for SOEs or for a
sector such as postal. Public choice explains in part why, a large
number of postal markets remain closed to competition and why, in
some cases, antitrust remedies for anti-competitive postal services
behavior of may not be possible.311 Like other network industry
incumbents with monopoly privileges, postal incumbents will fight
attempts to liberalize their markets in the name of the public
interest, even when private interests might be the true motivation.
With their large number of voters, postal workers can block
legislation such as the closure of post offices in small or rural

307. David T. Scheffman & Richard S. Higgins, Twenty Years of Raising Rivals’ Costs:
History, Assessment, and Future, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 371, 376 (2003).
308. Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. and European Merger Policy—Fault Lines and Bridges: Mergers
That Create Incentives for Exclusionary Practices, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 474 n.14
(2002) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50–53 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
309. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 196–97.
310. Raising rival’s cost is not a judicial antitrust claim but is a theoretical tool to frame
exclusionary behavior. Oftentimes courts use the theory of raising rival’s costs without explicit
mention of it.
311. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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locations that are too costly.312 For example, there are similar
numbers of postal employees as lawyers in the United States.313 Since
SOEs may have an employment maximization goal in addition to a
revenue maximization goal, this may play into the public choice both
for the SOE and for elected officials who can satisfy constituent
groups with increased numbers of jobs.314
Antitrust may be a possible solution to anti-competitive conduct
when there is no direct immunity to postal behavior. However, a lack
of immunity does not entail that antitrust will be an effective tool to
remedy anti-competitive conduct. In many cases, SOEs may be
dominant in their relevant markets; certainly this is true in the postal
sector where statutory monopoly protects the reserve sector. When
this is the case, SOEs have the potential to monopolize. This makes
the ability to utilize antitrust effectively more important. Yet,
domestic antitrust law may not apply the types of analytical tools to
remedy anti-competitive conduct by SOEs. Part II explored the
dynamics of SOEs’ incentives other than profit maximization.
Specific to the antitrust context, the general state of antitrust law
enforcement in most jurisdictions does not recognize that sustained
predation below cost is possible without recoupment, because it is
based on the premise of profit maximizing firms rather than
employment and/or revenue maximizing firms. Moreover, antitrust
law is ill-equipped to address predation by SOEs because antitrust
uses the same cost test for both private firms and SOEs. That is,
current antitrust tests do not impute the various government
preferences into the actual costs of SOEs.
Many antitrust agencies may use one or more of the tests
depending on the particular industry and factual situation in its
investigations. This Article focuses on the cost tests used in case law
developed from fully litigated cases rather than from agencies’ stated
preferences and use of different tests in investigations.315 It does so
312. Géradin & Sidak, supra note 146, at 163; Patricia L. Maclachlan, Post Office Politics
in Modern Japan: The Postmasters, Iron Triangles, and the Limits of Reform, 30 J. JAPAN.
STUD. 281 (2004).
313. GEDDES, supra note 163, at 1. The total number of USPS employees is in the range
of 700,000 to 900,000. This would make the USPS the second largest private employer in the
U.S. (between Wal-Mart and McDonalds) and the fourth largest non-military employer in the
world. Congress Has Mail, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2006, at A12.
314. See GEDDES, supra note 163, at 32–33, 83–86.
315. A number of agencies have reflected how they view predatory pricing cases in their
jurisdictions. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT
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because, from the standpoint of measuring results, it is easier to
understand and compare cases as outputs rather than investigations
that may have been dropped by an agency or party for any number
of reasons. Measuring cases provides for greater predictability even
though it may not reflect undercurrents in practice in a given
country based on agency guidelines on agency investigations that
never result in a decision. Competition laws are broad. Therefore,
much of the “action” is in case law. This Part surveys the leading
predatory pricing cases across jurisdictions and notes where there has
been a predatory pricing case brought against an SOE.316
1. Average variable cost
Marginal cost is the cost of the additional production of a unit of
output based on short run marginal costs. Costs below marginal cost
would be presumed unlawfully predatory. The problem with using
marginal cost is that it is difficult to measure. Areeda and Turner
suggested the use of average variable costs (“AVC”) as a proxy for
marginal cost.317 Average variable costs are costs that vary depending
on the level of output produced.318 This test seems to be the most
popular among U.S. courts. As the leading antitrust treatise notes,
“[n]umerous decisions have concluded that [average variable cost] is
at least the presumptive baseline for determining predation.”319

WORKING GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE ON PREDATORY PRICING AND EXCLUSIVE
DEALING/SINGLE
BRANDING
AND
RESPONSES
(2007),
http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/unilateral-conduct/
unilateral-conduct-working-group-and-responses-2007 (antitrust agency responses to a
questionnaire on predatory pricing).
316. To the author’s knowledge, there is no case around the world in which SOE
predation is treated differently than private firm predation, analytically.
317. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700–03 (1975). This is the most cited
law review article in U.S. courts on any antitrust issue. Many foreign courts also cite to it in
their discussion of predatory pricing. A number of professors have taken issue with Areeda and
Turner but accept the underlying premise of the AVC test that, in a static world, marginal
price pricing is optimal. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 32–35 (2005) (providing a review of the critiques).
318. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 29 (4th ed. 2005).
319. PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 425, ¶ 740a (2d ed.
2002).
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Nevertheless, a number of other cost based tests are available, and a
number of writers have shown the limitations of AVC.320
2. Average avoidable cost
Antitrust agencies around the world seem to be shifting to the
average avoidable cost (“AAC”) test.321 Average avoidable costs
consist of the costs (including variable and fixed costs) that could
have been avoided had there been no predatory pricing. Average
avoidable costs exclude sunk fixed costs that preceded the predatory
pricing.322 This test is advantageous because, by including both fixed
and variable costs, it reduces classification problems of fixed versus
variable costs, which are inherent to the use of an average variable
cost test. The premise behind AAC is that a price below AAC by
necessity involves a sacrifice of profits and will exclude equally
efficient rivals.323
3. Long run average incremental cost
The final cost test generally used in predation cases is long run
average incremental cost (“LRAIC”). This test, in contrast to AAC,
includes sunk fixed costs even when the sunk costs occurred prior to
the predatory pricing. LRAIC is the “per unit cost of producing the
predatory increment of output whenever such costs were
incurred.”324 This test is particularly useful in areas such as software
or pharmaceuticals because “the average variable costs of computer
software continuously decline and may approach insignificance as
sales volume becomes sufficiently high.”325 LRAIC may, in certain
circumstances, also be the cost test of choice in regulated industries
in which the predation may occur in related products or services.
320. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994); Bolton et al., supra note 302, at 2242–62.
321. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 65 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
322. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 275, at 29 n.27. (“A sunk cost is like spilled milk.
Once it is sunk, there is no use worrying about it, and it should not affect any subsequent
decisions. . . . Costs, including fixed costs, that are not incurred if operations cease are called
avoidable costs.”).
323. William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L.
& ECON. 49, 57–61 (1996).
324. Bolton et al., supra note 302, at 2272.
325. Id. at 2273.
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This test has been attacked because of the difficulty of imputing
costs, its effects on potential pro-competitive price cutting, and
because the cost cutting might not have an exclusionary effect.326
The following table explains, by jurisdiction, the various
predatory price tests employed in case law. Though antitrust agencies
may utilize different tests in their investigations, this chart limits the
inquiry to decided cases because it is easier to measure what
jurisdictions have done. Where there are no cases in which a
jurisdiction uses a particular test, it is noted with a “No” response.

TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE PREDATORY PRICING TEST
Jurisdiction

Pricing test

Utilized in

Representative Cases

case law
(rather than
in theory)?
United

Below AVC

Yes

Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC
Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 532 (5th Cir.

States327

1999); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1191 (3d Cir. 1995);
Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E.
Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1056
(6th Cir. 1984); Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T
Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
Below AAC

Yes

Below LRAIC

Yes

United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d
1109, 1115–16 (10th Cir. 2003).
MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co.,
708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982).

Below ATC

No

McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858
F.2d 1487, 1500 (11th Cir. 1988).

European
Commission

Below AVC

Yes

Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v.
Commission [1991] ECR I-3359.

326. Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 89
GEO. L.J. 2475, 2484 (2001).
327. The leading Supreme Court case in this area, Brooke Group, does not specify a
particular test. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222
(1993).
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Below AAC328

No

Below LRAIC

Yes

2009

COMP/35.141-Unitel Parcel
Service/DP AG, 20 Mar. 2001.

Below ATC

Yes

Below AVC

Yes

France Télécom v. Commission (ECJ 2
Apr. 2009).

United

Aberdeen Journals Ltd. v. The Office of
Fair Trading, [2003] CAT 11, 2003

Kingdom329

All E.R. (D) 137, ¶ 380.330
Below AAC

Yes

Cardiff Bus v. The Office of Fair

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

No

N/A

Below AVC

Yes

Statens Järnvägar MD 2000:2.

Trading [2008].331

Sweden

Chile

Below AAC

No

N/A

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

No

N/A

Below AVC

Yes

Decision No. 39, James Hardie
Fibrocementos Limitada, sentence of
the Supreme Court of November 29,
2006, sentence of the Tribunal for the
Defense of Competition of June 13,
2006.

South Africa

Below AAC

No

N/A

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

No

N/A

Below AVC

Yes

Nationwide Airlines and S. Afr.

328. This test is the current policy preference of the Commission. DIRECTORATE-GEN.
COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 31 (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.
329. Many SOEs in the UK will be incorporated as legal company entities and will be
treated exactly the same as privately owned equivalents. For such companies, competition law
should apply on exactly the same basis. Non-incorporated SOEs would be regulated by their
parent departments. It is possible, under such circumstances, that a situation of predation
would be addressed through administrative hearings.
330. The Court mentioned that “the cost-based rules set out in AKZO and Tetra Pak II,
while providing guidance, are not an end in themselves,” and the guidance therein was “open
to further development.” Aberdeen Journals Ltd. v. The Office of Fair Trading, [2003] CAT
11, 2003 All E.R. (D) 137, ¶ 380.
331. The OFT noted that “[i]n past cases [AVC and AAC] have been shown to be very
similar, since any cost that is variable over the period is also avoidable.” Id. at 7.156.
FOR
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Airways (92/IR/Oct00).

South

Below AAC

No

N/A

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

No

N/A

Below AVC

No

N/A

Below AAC

No

N/A

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

No

N/A

Other—Below

Yes

Cadland, Samsung Tesco, Ahnkook,

Korea332

the normal

Lucky, Sangyong.

trade price
Below AVC

New
Zealand

Canada

No

N/A

333

Below AAC

No

N/A

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

No

N/A

Below AVC

Yes

R. v. Hoffmann La Roche Ltd. (1980),
28 O.R. (2d) 164 (H.C.J.), affirmed
33 O.R. (2d) 694 (C.A.); R. v.
Consumers Glass Co., (1981), 33 O.R.
(2d) 228.

Below AAC

Yes

334

Canada (Director of Investigation and
Research) v. Air Canada (2003), 26
C.P.R. (4th) 476.

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

No

N/A

332. South Korea does not use a cost based test for predatory pricing.
333. There is only one case to date (Carter Holt Harvey Bldg. Prods. Group Ltd. v.
Commerce Comm’n, [2006] 1 N.Z.L.R. 145 (P.C.)). The case is not explicit as to the
particular price test, though the New Zealand Competition Commission has used both AVC
and AAC in investigations. This case law is analogous to that of Australia, which New Zealand
looks to for support. See Boral Besser Masonry Ltd. v. Austl. Competition and Consumer
Comm’n (2003) 215 C.L.R. 374 (Australian predatory pricing which also does not explicitly
adopt a particular price test). There is no predatory pricing case specific to New Zealand SOEs.
334. In Air Canada, the particular AAC test was statutorily mandated by the law that
addressed airlines. Since then, the preference for the Competition Bureau is for the AAC test
more generally. COMPETITION BUREAU, CAN., ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES: PREDATORY
PRICING 1415 (2008), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cbbc.nsf/vwapj/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e.pdf/$file/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e.pdf.
There have not been any predatory pricing decisions since Air Canada.
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Japan

Below AVC

Yes

2009

Daikoku

Below AAC

No

N/A

Below LRAIC

No

N/A

Below ATC

Yes

Hamaguchi Petroleum

V. PRICING TESTS BY JURISDICTION
A. United States
The basis for monopolization claims under U.S. antitrust law
derives from Section 2 of the Sherman Act.335 Case law has
developed regarding the appropriate test to use for predation,
though at lower court levels the standards are still not exactly
clear.336 The seminal Supreme Court case in this area is Brooke Group
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.337 Under Brooke Group, two
factors must be met in a successful predatory pricing claim. First, a
plaintiff must show that the prices at issue “are below an appropriate
measure of its rival’s costs.”338 Second, there must be a showing
“that the competitor had . . . a dangerous probability, of recouping
its investment in below-cost prices.”339 Two recent Supreme Court
cases, Linkline340 and Weyerhauser, 341 upheld the Brook Group
approach. Circuit courts across the United States have interpreted
the Brook Group case differently.342 For example, in United States v.
AMR Corp., the Fifth Circuit “decline[d] to dictate a definitive cost

335. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
336. Crane, supra note 317, at 7–9 (also noting that plaintiffs recast predatory behavior
into other antitrust classifications of harm to overcome courts’ reluctance to find for plaintiffs
on predation claims). On the interaction of rules and standards generally within antitrust, see
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
49 (2007).
337. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
338. Id. at 222.
339. Id. at 224.
340. Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’n, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009)
(supporting the use of predatory pricing tests in the retail cost context of a price squeeze
claim).
341. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007)
(upholding the cost test in predatory buying circumstances).
342. Crane, supra note 317, at 4 (stating that the Supreme Court has not resolved circuit
splits in the lower courts over fundamental predatory pricing issues).

1784

DO NOT DELETE

1713

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

Competition Policy

measure for all cases” although it used an average avoidable cost test
in that particular case.343
One reason that there are few predatory pricing cases is because
of the Supreme Court’s concern of the potential for type II errors of
mistake prosecution. As the Supreme Court notes, “mistaken
inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”344
As such, the Court has created various procedural hurdles for
plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases. Many of the same behaviors that
could lead to allegations of predatory pricing are precisely the ones
that could increase competition, such as price cuts. The Supreme
Court most recently restated this explicitly in Weyerhaeuser:
The costs of erroneous findings of predatory-pricing liability are
quite high because the mechanism by which a firm engages in
predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by
which a firm stimulates competition, and therefore mistaken
liability findings would chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect.345

1. U.S. Postal Service—a competition policy problem
There are a number of reasons why SOE antitrust cases are not
typical in the United States. Many are state action cases that involve
decisions based on whether or not the state action has been clearly
articulated rather than on substantive claims of anti-competitive
conduct. However, there has been a recent Supreme Court case
regarding not merely an SOE, but a postal SOE. As with other U.S.
cases involving SOEs, this case was not decided on the merits but on
whether or not antitrust immunity applied.346
The Supreme Court found that the Sherman Act did not apply
to the post office in United States Postal Service v. Flamingo

343. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003).
344. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
345. Weyerhaeuser Co., 549 U.S. at 312 (citing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226) (“The
costs of erroneous findings of predatory-pricing liability are quite high because the mechanism
by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by
which a firm stimulates competition, and therefore mistaken liability findings would chill the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”).
346. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. 736, 739–48 (2004).
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Industries.347 Among the claims that Flamingo made was that the
USPS sought to create a monopoly in mail sack production, and that
it could do so in large part because of its monopoly in the postal
reserve sector.348 In Flamingo, the Supreme Court stated that the
USPS was a part of the federal government and therefore not under
the purview of the antitrust laws of the United States.349 In a
departure from the prevailing economic literature on SOEs, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the USPS’ “powers are more limited
than those of private businesses. It lacks the prototypical means of
engaging in anti-competitive behavior: the power to set prices.”350
Under this flawed reasoning, an SOE does not have an incentive to
drive competitors out of business. As discussed earlier in this Article,
economic theory suggests that an SOE may have other motivations
than profit maximization. Even if an SOE does concern itself at times
with profit, it is also motivated by revenue maximization and by an
interest in increasing the scope of its services and its number of
employees.351 The reasoning of the Supreme Court ignores the
possibility of no-recoupment predation because of government
ownership and of raising rivals’ cost strategies.
A second weakness of the Supreme Court decision was its
reliance on the Postal Commission, the sector regulator, to
overcome potential anti-competitive behavior by the USPS.352 The
old Postal Rate Commission lacked a subpoena power and the ability
to mandate that the USPS provide it with data. Whatever data it
received came voluntarily from the USPS.353 Such a situation created
additional information asymmetries between the regulator and the
regulated industry and makes it more difficult to detect the anticompetitive cross subsidies between the postal and express delivery
sectors.
Because of the weakness of the postal regulator, antitrust would
have been the only alternative to remedy the anti-competitive

347. Id. at 736. Since then, the 2007 Act explicitly allows for the application of antitrust
to the USPS.
348. Flamingo, 540 U.S. at 738–39.
349. Id. at 739–48.
350. Id. at 747.
351. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 479; see also Rick Geddes, Do Vital
Economists Reach a Policy Conclusion on Postal Reform?, 1 ECO. J. WATCH 61 (2004).
352. Flamingo, 540 U.S. at 747.
353. Geddes, supra note 279, at 219.

1786

DO NOT DELETE

1713

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

Competition Policy

behavior. The Postal Commission that existed at the time of the
decision in 2004 was a weak regulator. Unlike regulators in other
network industries such as electricity or telecommunications, the
Postal Commission could not set rates. Rather, it could only
recommend rate changes, and such recommendations can be
overridden by the USPS board of directors.354 Yet, somehow, in spite
of a regulator that lacks the ability to set prices and to have its
dictates followed, the Court found that regulatory oversight was a
factor that prevented USPS from monopolization.355
In any determination of whether to bring an antitrust case, the
first and perhaps most important issue is one of assembling evidence.
Even if the USPS was subject to antitrust law at the time, bringing
such a case would have been very difficult, even if there had been an
effective measure of cost predation that took into account the
government advantages granted to the USPS. The existing U.S.
predatory pricing methodologies, as noted in the previous
discussion, required recoupment.356 While this might make sense for
private firms that operate based on profit, a cost based test is
ineffective for government owned firms with soft budget constraints
that might maximize revenue rather than profit.
Flamingo also underscores how important the predation and
raising rival’s cost claims are in terms of understanding the potential
anti-competitive harm on the part of the postal service. Since the
USPS defines the size of its reserve sector broadly, it has an incentive
to increase the definition of the reserve sector to reduce
competition.357 This limits the potential scope and scale of
competitors in the non-reserve and related sectors.358 The USPS also
has a unique monopoly over the mailbox itself, a monopoly found in
no other nation.359

354. 39 U.S.C. §§ 3625, 3628. These statutes have been repealed as of Dec. 20, 2006.
355. Flamingo, 540 U.S. at 740–41.
356. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 300 and accompanying text.
357. Compare the U.S. reserve sector to the EU’s postal liberalization, which
significantly reduces the reserve sector. EUR. PARL. ASS., Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by
Directive 2002/39/EC (1997).
358. This is particularly true when the SOE exhibits cost complementarities in its
production technology. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 198 n.39.
359. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981);
R. Richard Geddes, Anticompetitive Behavior in Postal Services, in COMPETING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT: ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 88 (R. Richard
Geddes ed., 2004); Géradin & Sidak, supra note 146, at 163.

1787

DO NOT DELETE

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

Under the Postal Act in place at the time of Flamingo,360 the
U.S. government offered the USPS credit guarantees through direct
borrowing from the Federal Financing Bank. The credit guarantee
allowed the USPS to provide a 12.5 basis point premium for its debt
above the U.S. Treasury bond rate.361 Furthermore, this financing
provided lower rates for the USPS than private firms. The Supreme
Court failed to understand that the USPS has the power of eminent
domain. It also has the power to self zone, while express delivery
competitors must apply for local zoning permits.362 Private firms
must go through the costly and time consuming process to set up an
effective distribution network.
Competition in postal and express delivery was not robust under
the old Postal Act. Evidence suggests that the USPS used its
monopoly over delivery to cross subsidize its express delivery service
where it faced competition.363 This behavior can be traced to the
1970 Postal Reorganization Act. The Act increased cross subsidies to
the competitive mail classes.364 For example, the rate increase of first
class post to twenty-five cents occurred while the Postal Service
decreased the price of next day express service, even though the
express service arm was already in the red.365 This postal rate increase
coincided with a reduction in the amount charged on foreign express
delivery by the USPS from $18 to $8.75.366 As a result, the USPS
shipped 66% more express mail packages than it had the year
before.367
B. European Union
Article 82 is the Treaty of Rome article that addresses the abuse
of a dominant position under EC law and, therefore, the basis for a
predatory pricing claim. A number of different elements make up the

360. The new Postal Reorganization Act of 2007 was in part a consequence of Flamingo.
361. R. Richard Geddes, Case Studies of Anticompetitive SOE Behavior, in COMPETING
WITH THE GOVERNMENT: ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 30–31
(R. Richard Geddes ed., 2004).
362. Id. at 34.
363. Geddes, supra note 359, at 93–97.
364. GEDDES, supra note 163, at 5.
365. JOHN R. LOTT, ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE? WHO SHOULD THE
COURTS BELIEVE? 69 (1999).
366. Id.
367. Id.
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criteria for a predatory pricing case for purposes of EC law. These are
sacrifice, anti-competitive foreclosure, and efficiencies.368 A
“sacrifice” by a firm may be predatory if, through evidence, a
plaintiff can show that conduct entails a sacrifice (loss) for the
dominant firm, which the firm undertakes deliberately.369 Sacrifice
does not require any single cost benchmark. Rather, such a sacrifice
occurs, according to the new EC Dominance Guidance paper, when
a firm (a) charges a lower price for some portion or all of its output
over the relevant time period at issue; or (b) expands its output over
the relevant time period; or (c) such that it incurs avoidable losses.370
The first cost benchmark that begins current EC analysis is average
avoidable cost. The Commission’s thought is that AAC is often the
same as AVC (since it is the variable costs that can be avoided).371
Pricing below AAC is therefore seen as sacrifice. The EU courts have
yet to use the AAC benchmark.
EC case law supports the sacrifice approach currently undertaken
by the Commission. The seminal case of AKZO Chemie v.
Commission, involving chemical products, held: “A dominant
undertaking has no interest in applying such prices except that of
eliminating competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its
prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position, since each
sale generates a loss . . . .”372 In AKZO, the pricing strategy
undertaken by AKZO Chemie which required a sacrifice of profits,
involved pricing at below the average total cost. The ECJ finds a
sacrifice when (a) prices are below AVC; or (b) prices are below ATC
but above AVC, and it is possible to prove that the firm has intended
to eliminate competitors. A line of cases has further developed this
approach. In Tetra Pak II,373 a case involving the manufacture of
aseptic and non-aseptic cartons, and in France Télécom,374 a case

368. COMM’N OF EUR. CMTYS., Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings 20,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance.pdf [hereinafter EUR. COMM’N].
369. Id.
370. Id. ¶ 63.
371. Note however that when AVC and ACC are dissimilar the Commission believes that
ACC is a better indicator of avoided costs. Id. at 20 n.40.
372. Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359.
373. Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1996 E.C.R. I05951.
374. Case C-202/07 P, France Telecom SA v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 2007,
available at http://curia.europa.eu.
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involving the charging of below-cost prices for ADSL high-speed
Internet services, the European Court of Justice held that the
Commission could use two separate cost measures. In France
Télécom, the court reaffirmed a lack of recoupment for institutional
reasons.375 The court reasoned that to demonstrate recoupment
would increase the evidentiary burden upon plaintiffs.376 This
reasoning provides an opening that might allow for cases against
SOEs to be successful, though it does not recognize that SOEs
might never need recoupment in the first place.
France Télécom also discusses, however, that recoupment may be
entertained where prices are below Average Total Cost (ATC) and
377
above AVC.
In such circumstances, proof of recoupment may
show eliminatory intent.378 The Commission entertains predation
claims between AVC and ATC because “[s]uch prices can drive from
the market undertakings which are perhaps as efficient as the
dominant undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial
resources, are incapable of withstanding the competition waged
against them.”379 This Commission belief in the importance of
protecting less efficient competitors goes to the idea embodied in
Article 82 of protecting the competitive process.380
The above cases all dealt with situations in which there was only
a single product market. In Deutsche Post AG, the Commission
examined different product markets in which it used Long Run
Average Incremental Costs for those non-common fixed costs.381
Deutsche Post AG is also the case most on point regarding predatory
pricing. This case involved the European Commission’s investigation
of Deutsche Post AG (“DPAG”) for abuse of a dominant position in
Germany. At the time of the initial complaint against DPAG, DPAG
was a one hundred percent SOE. The Commission found that
because of the excess revenue produced from the reserve area, the
reserve area could serve as a “likely and permanent source of

375. Id. ¶ 76.
376. Id.
377. Id. ¶ 14.
378. Id. ¶ 111.
379. AKZO, ECR I-3359, ¶ 72.
380. ALISON JONES, BRENDA SUFRIN & BRENDA SMITH, EC COMPETITION LAW 337
(3d ed. 2007).
381. Case COMP/35.141, Deustche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125).
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funding” for cross subsidization, because the revenues in the reserve
sector exceeded the costs.382
The Commission held that between 1990 and 1995, DPAG’s
revenue was below its incremental cost of providing mail order parcel
services. This allowed DPAG to successfully pursue predation. It did
so through the cross subsidization of activities in the competitive
sector by revenues from the reserve sector.383 The Commission also
discovered a longer lasting (1974-2000) anti-competitive fidelity
rebate scheme.384 The cross subsidization of DPAG enabled it to tie
its fidelity program for mail parcel services, even though the parcel
services was less efficient than its competitors.385 The fidelity rebates
prevented entry into the parcel services market by other firms
through tying.386 New entrants could not generate a critical mass
necessary to sustain entry into the market.387 This is an
understanding of raising rival’s costs even though it is not explicit.388
Because of the lack of critical mass, it was not possible for mail order
traders to set up an alternative delivery network infrastructure to that
of DPAG.389 The cost structure of the DPAG parcel services market
was such that between 1990 and 1995, every DPAG sale presented a
loss. In the medium term, this was not in the economic interest of
DPAG. In the long term, continuing this line of business prevented
entry by competitors.390 The Commission fined DPAG $24 million
and forbade any such conduct in the future.391 It also imposed a
structural remedy to separate DPAG’s commercial parcel services

382. Id. ¶ 6. More recently, the Commission has suggested that cross-subsidies may be
predatory, even in situations where the predator firm is not dominant in the predation market.
(“The Commission may also pursue predatory practices by dominant undertakings on
secondary markets on which they are not yet dominant. . . . While the dominant firm does not
need to predate to protect its dominant position in the market protected by legal monopoly, it
may use the profits gained in the monopoly market to cross-subsidize its activities in another
market and thereby threaten to eliminate effective competition in that other market.”). EUR.
COMM’N, supra note 368, at 20 n.39.
383. Case COMP/35.141, Deustche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125) ¶ 6.
384. DPAG had entered into standard form contract fidelity agreements in which firms
had to entrust all mail order parcels to DPAG. Id. ¶ 34.
385. Id.
386. Id. ¶ 35.
387. Id. ¶ 37.
388. Id. ¶ 38.
389. Id.
390. Id. ¶ 42.
391. Id. ¶ 52–53.
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from its reserved sector services.392 Given that the cost of the penalty
was less than the gains of anti-competitive conduct, it is unclear that
this remedy created a chilling effect on anti-competitive behavior.
Because the case did not need to get to particulars of what
constituted a “cost” for purposes of LRAIC cost methodology, we
lack an understanding on whether a different cost test would have
been used for SOEs.
C. United Kingdom
Section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 lays out the test for an
abuse of dominance under UK law.393 Guidelines by the Office of
Fair Trading (“OFT”) provide a more detailed explanation of when
pricing may be below cost.394 The trend in the UK is, like in the EU,
toward AAC, although AVC and AAC may be the same in a number
of cases.395 In Cardiff Bus, the Office of Fair Trade examined alleged
predation by Cardiff Bus regarding starting a no frills bus service in
response to a competitor on the same times and routes, running at a
loss and then existing after the competitor exited the market.396 The
OFT found that the actions taken by Cardiff Bus abused a dominant
position because of its exclusion, which did not allow for
competition on the merits.397 This was the first prohibition decision
in five years, but the reasoning would not suggest a way to treat SOE
predation, given the highly favorable and idiosyncratic facts in the
case.

392. Id.
393. Competition Act, 1998, c. 2, §18, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts1998/ukpga_19980041_en_1.
394. UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ASSESSMENT OF CONDUCT: DRAFT
COMPETITION LAW GUIDELINE FOR CONSULTATION (Apr. 2004), http://www.
oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/competition_law/oft414a.pdf.
395. See UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, DECISION NO. CA98/01/2008:
ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION BY CARDIFF BUS §§ 7.156–7.157, http://www.
oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_register/decisions/cardiffbus.pdf (“In past cases these
two bases have been shown to be very similar, since any cost that is variable over the period is
also avoidable. Often the AAC benchmark will be the same as the AVC benchmark, because in
many cases only variable costs can be avoided. However, where the dominant company makes
specific investments, such as expanding capacity in order to predate, then the fixed or sunk
investments made for this extra capacity will be included within AAC, causing AAC to exceed
AVC.”).
396. Id. §§ 1.1–1.4.
397. Id. §§ 1.1, 1.14.
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Aberdeen Journals is one of the very few decisions using the
abuse of dominance prohibition. It relies on the AVC test, although
it provides some wiggle room. As the Competition Appeal Tribunal
(CAT) noted, “[i]n our view, the cost-based rules set out in AKZO
and Tetra Pak II, while providing guidance, are not an end in
themselves and should not be applied mechanistically.”398 In
Aberdeen Journals, the CAT analyzed what costs should be included
within an AVC test as a price floor in a case involving predation by a
newspaper and stated that recoupment was not necessary.399 In some
instances, the CAT found that pricing below AVC might be lawful if
there is an objective justification for such pricing.400 It also noted
that prices above AVC but below ATC might be predatory assuming
that pricing below ATC forces exit from the market of an equally
efficient competitor.401 The pricing issues in question in Aberdeen
Journals went to questions of what was fixed versus variable but do
not provide insights as to what is a cost in the case of a firm that has
soft budget constraints.
D. South Africa
South Africa’s abuse of dominance provisions can be found in
Section 8(d)(iv) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998,
specifically “selling goods or services below their marginal or average
variable cost . . . .” In spite of a specific test in the statute, South
African case law from the Competition Tribunal explains that other
cost based tests may be used beyond that of MC and AVC.402 The
elements for a successful predation claim include a showing of
dominance based on market share and market power that the goods
or services are sold below MC or AVC and that efficiency defenses

398. ABERDEEN JOURNALS LTD & THE OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION
APPEAL TRIBUNAL, [2003] CAT 11, para. 380, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/
JdgFinal2AJ230603.pdf.
399. See id. ¶ 358.
400. Id. ¶ 357.
401. See id. ¶ 445.
402. Nationwide Airlines and S. African Airways (92/IR/Oct00) (“[T]he complainant is
not bound to follow the prescribed cost formula suggested in 8(d)(iv). In other words if a
complainant, relying on section 8(c), can show that a respondents costs are below some other
appropriate measure of costs not mentioned in the section it may prevail provided it adduces
additional evidence of predation beyond mere evidence of costs. To determine what that
should be we need to examine the phenomenon of predatory pricing and then examine some
of the approaches taken in other jurisdictions.”).
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do not outweigh competitive harm.403 The Commission has
addressed frequent challenges recently against SOEs for unfair
competition and abuse of their dominant market position. One case
addresses predatory pricing by an SOE, South Africa Airways. In that
case, the Competition Tribunal of South Africa ruled against the
plaintiff based on an AVC test.404 The Tribunal noted that it was
open to the use of other tests. However, there was no explicit
discussion of cost based tests for SOEs and whether it would be
different for non-SOEs.
E. South Korea
There are two bases for a predatory pricing claim under Korean
law, called the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. Article 3-2
prohibits the abuse of dominant positions, and Article 23 of the Act
that prohibits unfair business practices and applies to predatory
pricing by non-dominant firms. Unlike other jurisdictions, Korea
does not utilize a cost based test for predation. Rather, Korean
predatory decisions focus on whether or not the alleged predatory
pricing was “fair.” According to Korea’s predatory pricing test, price
can be above average total cost and still be predatory. Intent is
relevant, and there must be market foreclosure or consumer harm.
A series of examples of Korean case law provides a sense of what
constitutes unfair competition. In the Cadland case, the Korea Fair
Trade Commission (“KFTC”) argued that Cadland purchased
software from an American company but then bid at one won to
provide Korean Electric with thousands of copies of this software
(though the case does not specify the amount of the U.S. purchase,
presumably it was at an amount greater than one won).405 The KFTC
argued that Cadland was willing to do this because once Korean
Electric started using its software, Cadland would have locked in
future business worth millions, making the contract essentially a long
term deal.406 Such underbidding conduct, according to the KFTC,
constituted unfair and anti-competitive practice.407 This line of
reasoning holds for other Korean predatory pricing cases, such as
403. See South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 7.
404. See Nationwide Airlines and S. African Airways (92/IR/Oct00).
405. See KFTC v. Cadland Co., [1996] KFTC 96-18.
406. Id. The KFTC estimated that the winner of this bid would be guaranteed to get
about 3 billion won, or about $2.2 million, worth of future business.
407. Id.
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Samsung Tesco,408 and predatory bidding cases such as Ahnkook, 409
Lucky, 410 and Sangyong. 411
In Samsung Tesco, Samsung Tesco paid Coca Cola 984 won
(approximately $0.73 per 1.5 liter) to distribute Coca Cola in its
stores from August 30, 2000 through November 2, 2000.412
However, Samsung Tesco sold Coca Cola below its cost at 390 won
to 890 won (approximately $0.25 to $0.65) in order to attract more
customers.413 KFTC concluded that this was anti-competitive.414 The
case does not offer specifics as to whether or not there was some sort
of short term price cutting defense that might have been part of
some sort of loss leader promotion. A pro-competitive defense is
possible under Korean predatory pricing law although the case does
not mention if Samsung Tesco made such a defense.
The Korean Supreme Court ruled against predatory pricing in a
claim that the KFTC brought in Hyundai Information Technology
Co.415 In Hyundai, the city of Incheon offered a contract for
software with an estimated price of 972 million won (approximately
$700,000).416 Three companies bid.417 Hyundai Information
Technology Co. bid at 29 million won (approximately $21,000),
Daewoo Information Systems Co. bid at 195 million won (about
$141,000), and Samsung SDS bid at 330 million won
(approximately $240,000).418 Daewoo and Samsung complained to
the KFTC and the KFTC intervened.419 The parties litigated the
case, and it went to the Korean Supreme Court,420 which held for
Hyundai.421 It ruled that Hyundai’s bid of 29 million won did not
violate Korea’s competition law because: 1) all other bidders bid

408. See KFTC v. Samsung Tesco Co., [2001] KFTC 2001-31.
409. See KFTC v. Ahnkook Co., [1994] KFTC 94-328.
410. See KFTC v. Lucky Brands Co., [1983] KFTC 83-12.
411. See Letter from KFTC to Sangyong Co., Case No. 9512.1241 (instructing
Sangyong to cease and desist).
412. KFTC v. Samsung Tesco Co., [2001] KFTC 2001-31.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See Hyundai Info. Tech. Co. v. KFTC, [1999].
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
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below the City’s estimated price, and 2) the contract was for a
software system that did not have any entrenched derivative benefits
attached to it.422 The second factor distinguished it from the fact
pattern in Cadland.
F. Chile
Article 3ºc of the Chilean Competition Act prohibits predatory
practices.423 So far, there has been only one predatory pricing case in
Chile’s antitrust jurisprudence, James Hardie Fibrocementos
Limitada.424 The Tribunal held with fixed assets that produced both
products, each product was above AVC.425 Moreover, there was no
recoupment in another market.426 On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed and held that James Hardie conducted predatory pricing in
the first market by selling below ATC and then recouped its losses in
the second market.427 This case involved a private firm rather than an
SOE.428 The issue of what constituted a cost did not come up in
terms of the analysis of either the Tribunal or the Supreme Court;
they merely discussed the allocation of costs as to AVC.429 Chilean
case law is therefore silent on what outcome would be likely for a
predatory firm with a soft budget constraint.
G. Canada
The Competition Act governs Canadian competition law.430
Predatory pricing analysis is a sub-section of abuse of dominance,
Section 79(1) of the Act.431 Moreover, Article 50 provides for

422. Id.
423. Competition Law, art. 3ºc, 2005, http://www.fne.cl/descargas/normativa/
competition_law.zip (Chile).
424. See generally James Hardie Fibrocementos Limitada, sentence of the Supreme Court
of Nov. 29, 2006; sentence of the Tribunal for the Def. of Competition of June 13, 2006.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Competition Act, R.S.C. ch. 34 (1985).
431. See Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Air Can., [2003] 26 C.P.R. 4th 476
(Comp.Trib.) (Can.); see also Canada (Dir. of Investigation and Research) v. Tele-Direct
(Publ’ns), Inc., [1997], 73 C.P.R. 3d 1 (Can.).
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penalties for unreasonably low prices under Section 50 of the Act.432
In 2008, the Canadian Competition Bureau published its Predatory
Pricing Enforcement Guidelines, which present state of the art
thinking on Canadian predatory pricing policy.433 The most recent
Canadian predatory pricing case is Air Canada, which utilized an
AAC test.434 Air Canada marked a shift from the AVC test
previously adopted under R. v. Hoffmann La Roche Ltd.435 In Air
Canada, the litigation focused on what constituted an avoidable cost
for an airline route. For example, starting an unprofitable route
might make economic sense because revenues might increase on
other routes. This might add value to the network due to an increase
in travelers. Whether to count such routes, called those “beyond
contribution,” as an avoidable cost would impact whether such
conduct could be shown as predatory.436 The Tribunal held that Air
Canada had engaged in predatory pricing below AAC on two routes.
However, the Commission ultimately dropped the case because of
Air Canada’s bankruptcy and other changes in Canada’s airline
sector. As the cost based tests all deal with private firms, it is unclear
how soft budget constraints might be counted as costs. However,
the Air Canada decision suggests that judicial administrability might
have been a factor in how costs are to be calculated because of the
fear that plaintiffs would be unable to carry out complex cost
calculations.437
H. New Zealand
The generic prohibition against the abuse of dominance under
the Commerce Act is in Section 36. There is only one case to date
on predatory pricing, Carter Holt Harvey Building Production Group

432. See R. v. Hoffmann La Roche Ltd., [1980] 28 O.R.2d 164 (H.C.J.) aff’d, 33
O.R.2d 694 (Can.); R. v. Consumers Glass Co., [1981] 33 O.R.2d 228 (Can.).
433. Competition Enforcement Bureau, Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines
(2008), http://www.cb-bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e.
pdf/$file/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e.pdf.
434. Edward Iacobucci, Predatory Pricing, the Theory of the Firm and the Recoupment
Test: An Examination of Recent Developments in Canadian Predatory Pricing Law. 51
Antitrust Bull. 281 (2006) (providing in depth treatment of the case).
435. Compare Hoffmann La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 164, with Air Can. 26 C.P.R.4th at
476.
436. Air Can. 26 C.P.R. 4th at 476, ¶ 301.
437. See Cyril Ritter, Predatory Pricing Law in Canada, Australia and New Zealand:
Recent Developments, 2005 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 48, 52.
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Ltd. v. CC.438 The case involved differentiated products in the
building insulation markets.439 The case is not explicit as to the
particular price test, though in investigations the New Zealand
Competition Commission has used both AVC and AAC.440 This case
is analogous to one in Australia, to which New Zealand looked for
guidance in its antitrust jurisprudence.441 In the Australian case,
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd. v ACCC, the court did not explicitly adopt
a single price test.442 There is no predatory pricing case specific to
New Zealand SOEs. However, it is unlikely that it would be possible
to win such a case in New Zealand as the Privy Council stated that
recoupment is a requirement in a successful claim of predatory
pricing.443
I. Sweden
Under Article 19 of the Swedish Competition Act, a firm may
not abuse a dominant position. The Swedish Market Court, the
highest Swedish Court in competition law cases, has decided one
predatory pricing case. This was a case where a small competitor, BK
Tåg, sued the Swedish state owned railways, Statens Järnvägar
(“SJ”).444 The Market Court found that SJ had a dominant position
in the Swedish market for operation of passenger traffic on railway
and that SJ had committed a breach of Section 19 of the Swedish
Competition Act in a bidding contest for operation of regional
passenger traffic on railway.445 In its analysis, the Market Court used
the Akzo test.446 The court found that SJ in its tender had priced
below AVC.447 The court also found that there was a presumption of
438. [2006] 1 N.Z.L.R. 145; [2004] 11 T.C.L.R. 200 (P.C.).
439. CC v Carter Holt Harvey Bldg. Prods. Ltd (2000) 9 TCLR 535, Supplementary
Judgment of Professor Lattimore, para. 51 (“INZCO could recoup the cost of the Wool Line
special pricing arrangement if the scheme meant that NWP was constrained from expanding in
the market or eliminated from it. The recoupment would take the form of maintaining the list
prices of Pink Batts at levels that were otherwise threatened by NWP, and at the same time
increasing its market share for Pink Batts and other INZCO products.”).
440. See N.Z. Commerce Comm’n, 2008 Unilateral Conduct Working Group
Questionnaire submission to the ICN (on file with author).
441. Id.
442. [2003] 195 A.L.R. 609; [2003] 215 C.L.R. 374.
443. Id. at 469–70.
444. Marknadsdomstolen [MD] [Market Court] 2000-02-01 (Swed.).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
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exclusionary intent; a presumption SJ did not successfully rebut.448
SJ’s fine amounted to eight million Swedish crowns.449 On one hand,
the outcome of this test might signal that an SOE can be found
guilty under an AVC test. However, a closer examination of
competition policy in Sweden suggests all is not well regarding anticompetitive conduct by SOEs.
Specific to the area of competition in the postal sector, a report
by the Swedish Postal and Telecom Agency suggested significant
limitations for competition law to improve competition in the postal
sector. Its report stated,
The Swedish incumbent has been very active in defending its
former monopoly and that is reflected in the many legal disputes.
The Swedish Competition Act, which is the implementation of the
EC rules on competition, does not appear to be well suited for a
transition from monopoly to a market solution.450

The report suggested that the agency understands the weakness
of the current antitrust jurisprudence regarding SOEs on predation
issues, an area affected by this transition.
J. Japan
Two sets of provisions under the Japanese Act Concerning
Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair
Trade address predatory pricing. The first is the Article 3 prohibition
against monopolization. The second is Article 19, which prohibits
unfair trade practices. Section 6 of Article 19 proscribes predatory
pricing. According to Section 6, “excessively below the cost incurred
in the said supply” is interpreted as below AVC, and “a low
consideration” is interpreted as below ATC.451 Judicially, the AVC
standard has been recognized in the private action Daikoku

448. Id.
449. Stefan P. Lindeborg & Tommy Pettersson, Comments on a Swedish Case on
Predatory Pricing—Particularly on Recoupment, 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 75 (2001)
(providing analysis of the case).
450. NAT’L POST AND TELECOM AGENCY, THE LIBERALISED SWEDISH POSTAL
MARKET—THE SITUATION 14 YEARS AFTER THE ABOLITION OF THE MONOPOLY, Mar. 2,
2007,
available
at
http://www.pts.se/upload/Documents/EN/Postal_liberalisation
_2007_march 07.pdf.
451. DESIGNATION OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, (1982), available at http://www.
cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/utp.pdf.
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decision452 whereas the Hamaguchi Petroleum decision recognized
above AVC but below the ATC test.453
A private suit, Yamato v. Japan Post, concerned predatory pricing
by Japan Post. 454 Both the Tokyo District Court and Tokyo High
Court rejected Yamato’s claim made pursuant to Article 24. The
Tokyo High Court rejected the assertion by the plaintiff that Japan
Post’s cost in commercial parcel delivery should be calculated on a
“stand-alone” basis (separated from Japan Post’s regulated postal
delivery). The court opined that it is economically rational for an
enterprise, when it enters into new business, to make use of its
resources in its existing business. Separate from the case, the Japan
Federal Trade Commission (“JFTC”) published its opinion on the
case as a study group report in 2006. The JFTC study group opinion
was hostile to the position of Japan Post, advocating a “stand-alone”
basis (at least regarding Japan Post pre-privatization) should be the
method used to allocate common fixed costs when a monopolist in
market A entered market B.455 The Tokyo High Court in Yamato
rejected the idea of a stand-alone basis because the stand-alone cost
method was not mature as a legal test. As a general matter, the
JFTC’s regulatory standard on low pricing is that pricing below
purchase price is illegal when it harms competition.456 One problem
in the Yamato case was a lack of evidence because the JFTC did not
first bring a case of its own. Yamato could not obtain necessary cost
data of the Japan Post to prove its sales-below-cost arguments.
Therefore, it had to rely on unfair advantage, such as the tax exempt
status the Japan Post enjoys relative to private companies.
There have been some other SOE predatory pricing cases in
Japan. All of them were private suits. Nearly all of the decisions held
for the defendants.457 The only exception was the Tokyo District
452. Tokyo High Court decision, case no. 1413, 2002 (Ne), (Sept. 29, 2004).
453. JFTC remedy order, 53 SHINKETSUSHU 867–68 (May 16, 2006).
454. Tokyo High Court decision, case no. 1078, 2006 (Ne), LEXIS 28140088 (Nov.
28, 2007).
455. See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, ISSUES CONCERNING POSTAL SERVICES AND
COMPETITION POLICY COINCIDING WITH THE ENACTMENT OF THE LAW OF THE
PRIVATIZATION OF THE POSTAL SERVICES (2006), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/epage/pressreleases/ 2006/July/060721.pdf.
456. See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, GUIDELINES CONCERNING UNFAIR PRICE
CUTTING UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT 2–4 (Nov. 20, 1984), translation available at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/pricecutting.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
457. Postcard case (Osaka High Court in 1994); Bus for Aged Citizens case (Yamaguchi
District Court Shimonoseki Branch in 2006).
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Court decision in the Slaughterhouse case.458 The Supreme Court
opined in that case that the Antimonopoly Act was applicable to low
pricing by the Tokyo Municipal Slaughterhouse that cross-subsidized
its sales. Nevertheless, the district court found the low pricing to be
legal since the pricing did not harm fair competition.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SOEs remain an important part of economic life in many
countries. This Article suggests that where SOEs face competition
from other firms and where their advantages provided from the state
are minimal, the corporate governance of such SOEs tends to be
stronger than in situations in which SOEs face competition and
behave as much as possible like private firms, such as in Sweden and
New Zealand. SOE corporate governance seems to be better when
there is more accountability. There is more accountability when SOE
governance statutes reflect those of private firms. This result holds
across legal origins. Indeed, some of the most un-competitive postal
SOEs are in common law advanced economies such as Canada and
the United States which tend to score highly in the LLSV literature.
Antitrust solutions to SOE anti-competitive behavior seem to hold
across jurisdictions regardless of legal origin. Predatory pricing
jurisprudence does not distinguish between private and government
firms even though the incentives may be different given the soft
budget constraints of government firms.
The next stage in research in the area of competition and
corporate governance of SOEs is to undertake a full cross country
comparison and to do so across a number of different types of SOEs.
This analysis would examine all cases and determine how the law in
practice matches the law on the books for both corporate and
antitrust laws. This is a significant task. The government oversight
across SOEs varies both across and within countries. In some
countries there are sector regulators or multiple regulators (sector,
financial, etc.) to overview the SOEs. In other countries there is a
general SOE law. With the creation of such a database, it would be
possible to undertake cross country quantitative analysis to learn
more about some dynamics of SOEs.

458. The Supreme Court: Tokyo Municipal Slaughter House decision Supreme Court
decision, 43 (12) Minshu 2078, 2083 (Dec. 14, 1999).
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Below are a number of recommendations that would improve
competition and corporate governance regardless of the legal origin
of SOEs.
A. Improved External Oversight
An annual performance review beyond annual reports may be
necessary to encourage good corporate governance of SOEs. This
would benchmark the SOE relative to other SOEs in the same sector
in other countries and establish how well the corporation is meeting
its target relative to similar entities elsewhere.459 The benchmarking
would include specific metrics to measure financial, management,
and service aspects of the SOE relative to other SOEs.460
Benchmarking across countries is made difficult by the various goals
that SOEs might have in different countries.
Separate oversight functions for financial and management
regulation across government agencies would reduce opportunities
for regulatory capture. Other types of oversight include mandating
accounting of SOEs by private auditing firms rather than by another
part of government. This would reduce the possibility of government
self dealing that might limit a full discovery of the condition of SOEs
in auditing results. Part of an improvement in oversight would
include an increase in effective penalties for poor oversight and
management, particularly when SOEs engage in anti-competitive
actions. There is a need for personal sanctions for bad behavior on
the part of SOE managers such as the loss of job for SOE executives
and barring work from other parts of government for a set time
period after they are fired from SOE management. Another potential
penalty would be for an SOE that is caught engaging in unlawful
anti-competitive behavior or poor corporate governance to enter

459. E.g., Maria Luisa Corton & Sanford V. Berg, Benchmarking Central American
Water Utilities, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 267 (2009); Céline Nauges & Caroline van den Berg,
Economies of Density, Scale and Scope in the Water Supply and Sewerage Sector: A Study of Four
Developing and Transition Economies, 34 J. REG. ECON. 144 (2008).
460. See Antonio Estache, Serigio Perelman & Lourdes Trujillo, Infrastructure
Performance and Reform in Developing and Transition Economies: Evidence from a Survey of
Productivity Measures (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3514, 2005)
(providing a framework for benchmarking); Céline Nauges & Caroline van den Berg,
Economies of Density, Scale and Scope in the Water Supply and Sewerage Sector: A Study of Four
Developing and Transition Economies, 34 J. REG. ECON. 144 (2008) (using panel data for cross
country benchmarking).
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into a process of structural separation between the statutory
monopoly business and the competitive business.461
Another possibility is to forbid the SOE to compete in the nonregulated related field. The potential problem with such an outcome,
at least in the postal sector, is that the postal SOE will be unable to
use its economies of scope to offer products and services in related
markets. The advantage of utilizing the economies of scope would
be that such economies keep the price down for a number of goods
and services that are basic to the regulated part of the business.
Another way to think about structural separation would be to ensure
that SOEs separate the profit-making and non profit-making goals
into separate firms. Codes of conduct should be established and
enforced between regulated and unregulated entities. Where SOEs
could compete based on efficiency concerns, they should not be
allowed to potentially utilize funds from non-profit making functions
in anti-competitive ways.
Another method of external oversight is through the capital
markets. Governments should make SOEs go to capital market for
loans. This will encourage SOEs to be disciplined to pay back the
loans, so long as there are no soft budget constraints. If governments
implicitly guarantee loans, this solution is not viable because the
worse the governance of the firm, the better the rate, because the
government is more likely to guarantee repayment of the loans.
B. Improve Internal Corporate Governance
It is important to improve the quality of internal corporate
governance of SOEs. The corporate social responsibility movement
and the shareholder democracy movement have been issues of
significant attention in both academic and policy circles.462 If we are
to take the corporate social responsibility movement seriously, it is
particularly necessary to do so with regard to SOEs. Governance is
more opaque and less responsive to shareholders of SOEs than of
publicly traded firms. This would entail greater penalties for a
fiduciary breach on the part of the SOE board. This should include
461. But see MARK A. JAMISON & JAMES SICHTER, PUBLIC UTILITY RESEARCH CTR.,
BUSINESS SEPARATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
(2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1384582 (noting the difficulties of separation in the U.S.
telecom context).
462. See, e.g., Michael Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Producing Efficient Corporate
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L.R. (forthcoming 2009).
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steep financial penalties for managers and directors that breach their
duties. Governments should strive to increase the use of nongovernmental appointed directors on the board of SOEs. The state
should reduce the number of political appointments on SOE boards
and increase the number of directors who have previous business
experience that would be useful in running a company. There might
be some informal norms such as shaming that might improve
corporate governance. For shaming sanctions to be successful, there
needs to be enough transparency for information about bad
corporate governance of SOEs to emerge and a sense in a given
country that the lack of accountability is something for which one
should be ashamed.
A problem that SOEs face more than private firms is soft targets
for performance. Whereas performance contracts might work for
private firms, the incentives are different for public firms and
therefore performance contracts are not as successful. Because of the
asymmetry of information between managers and shareholders (or in
the case of SOEs, the government officials acting on the public’s
behalf), management will try to create performance contracts based
on easily achievable targets. However, what separates performance
contracts in private and state firms is that private firms can reduce the
problem of soft targets and information asymmetry by creating stock
options and by using benchmarking for performance to better align
management interests with those of shareholders.
C. Corporatization of SOEs
Some countries have shifted the nature of SOE governance to a
more corporatized form of governance. In postal delivery, most EU
countries’ postal operators have a corporatized form.463 SOE
management and directors may be mandated to have specific skills
and/or experience.464 Creating a competency profile provides a set of
standards by which government can require effective managers.
Policy targets, including financial goals, would create quantifiable
targets for the SOE to meet. The failure to meet such targets could
lead to the ouster of SOE leadership. This process would better align

463. WIK CONSULT, STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, MAIN DEVELOPMENTS
(2004–2006) 3 (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/
doc/studies/2006-wik-final_en.pdf.
464. Scott, supra note 70, at 4.

IN THE POSTAL SECTOR
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management’s interest with residual owners’ because management
would have an incentive to create a more efficient SOE.
Corporatization has proven to be an intermediate step for SOEs
that reduces some incentives for mismanagement due to soft budget
constraints and a lack of internal and external accountability by
making the SOE act more like a private firm.465 Corporatization
forces firms to ask if there are better ways to achieve lower costs. If
an SOE is in a corporatized form, it is easier to keep track of the
performance because of better and more information. Some
empirical work supports the proposition that corporatization can
improve the efficiency of SOEs.466 In most cases, this is a second best
solution. If there are strong concerns about managerial incentives of
SOEs, corporatization is not equivalent to privatization.467 However,
if privatization is not possible politically, corporatization may be a
second best solution or an intermediary step to privatization, such as
in New Zealand for the New Zealand Post.
Where SOE postal incumbents have been commercialized and
corporatized, SOEs behave more like private companies. Generally,
this has been successful and not surprisingly, it is successful in
precisely those countries that provide for greater competition.468
Thus, competition and good corporate governance indeed seem to
be somewhat substitutable. A successful commercialization provides
an example of how to limit some of the impulse of an SOE postal
incumbent to raise the cost of rivals.
Let us examine the case of New Zealand. Prior to its
transformation, New Zealand Post had a statutory monopoly with its
large reserve sector based on parcels with a weight of less than 500g.

465. José A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Alternatives to Infrastructure Privatization Revisited: Public
Enterprise Reform from the 1960s to the 1980s, at 25–27 (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 4391, 2007).
466. Varouj A. Aivazian, Ying Ge & Jiaping Qiu, Can Corporatization Improve the
Performance of State-Owned Enterprises Even Without Privatization?, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 791
(2005) (analyzing corporatized Chinese SOE performance).
467. Shleifer, supra note 67, at 137–38 (claiming that private ownership is superior to
government ownership because private ownership creates incentives to reduce costs while
government officials have incentives to supply monopoly rents); see Besley & Ghatak, supra
note 68 (arguing that government ownership should be limited only in situations where the
SOE project creates primarily public goods and the government values those goods more than
anyone else).
468. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Developing Policies for the Future of the
United States Postal Service, in COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTAL AND
DELIVERY SECTOR (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2003).
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On April 1, 1998, New Zealand removed the statutory monopoly on
all letters, regardless of weight. New Zealand Post was given, for the
most part, equal treatment with all other postal operators including
full application of competition laws. By the end of the year, there
were seventeen registered postal operators within New Zealand. The
majority of these competitors were small local businesses.
Corporatization of the SOE in New Zealand between 1987 and
1998 increased transparency and accountability of New Zealand
Post. Staff became more productive (a staff decrease of 40%, fewer
handles, and an increase of business of 20%), New Zealand Post
more profitable (a $NZ37.9 million loss became a profit of $NZ47.7
million), prices lower (the basic letter price was at the same nominal
price in 1987 and 1998), and service delivery quality improved.469
New Zealand closed a third of the country’s post offices. This led to
remarkable results: 100% increase in labor productivity, 30% increase
in mail volume and a 30% decrease in both the real price of postage
and of costs. These changes all occurred while maintaining state
ownership of New Zealand Post.470 One can tell a similar story in
Sweden. The loss of the postal monopoly in Sweden was a significant
reason that Posten become more efficient and eliminated many
redundant post offices and centers even while maintaining its
universal service mission.471
Corporatization is not an end solution. Even if the goals of
private and public firms were the same, the behavioral outcome of
such firms would be different. As Alchian explains, “[E]ven with the
same explicit organizational goals [between public and private firms],
the cost-rewards system impinging on the employers and the
‘owners’ of the organization are different.”472 Not surprisingly,
therefore, some corporatized SOEs do very poorly, even those in
common law jurisdictions. Both USPS and Canada Post are

469. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN THE POSTAL SECTOR, DAFFE/CLP(99)22, 247–52.
470. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 288, at 79.
471. It is possible that contestable markets theory might apply in the liberalized postal
sector. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). Contestable
market theory is based on a number of assumptions and may not hold outside of these
assumptions. See, e.g., Fabio Domanico, The European Airline Industry: Law and Economics of
Low Cost Carriers, 23 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 199 (2007); Joseph Farrell, Cheap Talk,
Coordination, and Entry, 18 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1987).
472. Alchian, supra note 77, at 817–18.

1806

DO NOT DELETE

2/10/2010 1:12 PM

1713

Competition Policy

corporatized but both maintain a significant reserve sector. Perhaps
the better lesson about corporatization is the more an SOE actually
looks corporatized, with director control rather than government
control, and the more competition it faces to ensure that
corporatization actually matters, the more SOE outcomes may reflect
those of private firms.
D. Increase Competition
Competition means the elimination or at the very least a
significant reduction of the reserve sector, such as what the EU has
undertaken. It also means a limit upon incumbent firms to abuse the
universal services requirement for anticompetitive purposes. As noted
earlier in this Article, liberalization creates competitive pressure that
will eliminate poor governance from firms. Liberalization is
politically difficult.473 This is especially true in the current period of
world-wide economic crisis. The rhetoric of liberalization has not
matched the reality of liberalization, where in fact some liberalization
efforts are merely a different and perhaps only somewhat less
restrictive form of regulation. However, when these half hearted
liberalization schemes fail, there may be significant public resentment
and then pushback against liberalization.474 Even in the developing
world, postal competition has proved sustainable. One example is
Tanzania where total mail volume since liberalization increased from
0.87 letters per capita per year to 1.2 per capita per year.475
Competition may have other effects. It might create a bypass for
certain parts of an industry by alternative means. For example, the
internet has changed the way in which people send messages to each
other. This has made the mail system susceptible to a death spiral in
which the high end customers leave the system and firms raise costs
to make up for these departures, thereby leading to more departures.
E. Privatization
Privatization eliminates the soft budget constraint because firms
have to rely upon the market, which creates a level of financial

473. See, e.g., Edward Iacobucci, Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Canadian
Experience with Deregulation, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2006).
474. Fox, supra note 296, at 216–17.
475. Kenny, supra note 142, at 77.
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discipline.476 One legislative response to the problem of SOEs has
been to privatize these enterprises.477 During the 1980s and 1990s,
countries privatized over 100,000 firms around the world,
particularly in Latin America, East Asia, and the former Soviet
block.478 SOEs are less efficient than private firms. Therefore the
overall performance of SOEs vis-à-vis private firms compares
poorly.479 Where privatization has not led to greater efficiencies, in
many cases, it has been a result of the failure of the architects to
introduce liberalization in conjunction with privatization. Put
differently, when privatization fails, it seems to be because of flawed
design and implementation.480 That is, there are potential risks to
privatization when there are situations of market failure and where
there is inadequate regulation to protect the market function.
Empirical work in Russia suggests that privatization without
adequate regulation can lead to corporate looting.481 Similarly,
Carlos Slim became the world’s richest man because he bought the
telecom incumbent in Mexico when it was privatized and allowed to
maintain its statutory monopoly in fixed line telephony.482
A difficult situation may emerge where, if there is no
privatization and liberalization in the near term, the yearly
government bailout will create an even bigger problem in the long
term. At that time, the effect of trying to create cost controls on

476. See Emmanuelle Auriol & Pierre M. Picard, Infrastructure and Public Utilities
Privatization in Developing Countries, 23 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 77, 80 (2009)
(providing a literature review).
477. In many cases, successful liberalization has proceeded with efforts at privatization of
SOEs. John Nellis & Nancy Birdsall, Privatization Reality Check: Distributional Effects in
Developing Countries, in REALITY CHECK: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12 (John Nellis & Nancy Birdsall eds., 2005). These findings
support earlier empirical studies suggesting that privatized firms outperformed SOEs and
increased their efficiency. See Megginson, Nash & van Randenborgh, supra note 31, at 405;
Shleifer, supra note 67, at 134–41.
478. Nellis & Birdsall, supra note 477, at 3, 11–12 (arguing that those privatizations that
were pro-competitive addressed the equity concerns regarding the distribution of the benefits
of privatization).
479. Simeon Djankov & Peter Murrell, Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A
Quantitative Survey, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 739 (2002) (studying the effects of privatization).
480. Harry M. Trebing & Sarah P. Voll, Infrastructure Deregulation and Privatization in
Industrialized and Emerging Economies, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 307, 311 (2006).
481. Bernard Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian
Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2133 (2001).
482. See D. Daniel Sokol, Barriers to Entry in Mexican Telecommunications: Problems and
Solutions, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001).
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SOEs may come at a higher cost. Addressing this situation means
overcoming significant public choice problems not merely from
SOEs but from vested private interests that benefit from the status
quo. Though competition advocacy on the part of antitrust agencies
may help, competition advocacy has its limits as agencies are subject
to political retribution from legislators who might not want a procompetitive message.483 For example, while the FTC has had a strong
advocacy program,484 it has never questioned why there should be a
state action exemption, nor did it discuss, in the postal context, the
possibility of privatization of the USPS.
F. Create an Effective Antitrust Test
One problem with antitrust approaches to predatory pricing
cost-based tests is that they do not account for the governmentcreated distortion in creating a revised baseline for how to measure a
cost.485 One conclusion from the cross-country analysis is that
antitrust has been ineffective, across legal origins, in accounting for
the nature of SOEs in cost-based tests to determine predatory
pricing. Incremental cost tests may not detect potentially anticompetitive behavior by SOEs. As Panzar suggests, “Because a
revenue maximizing SOE wishes to offer below cost prices on a
continuing basis, it may find it optimal to alter its strategic
investment policies so as to distort the outcome of any incremental
cost test to which its rates may be subject.”486 However, current
predatory pricing tests do not account for this difference.
This Article suggests that antitrust predatory pricing tests require
an imputation of the various costs and benefits of government
ownership and government support of SOEs. This test would
measure the various indirect benefits that SOE providers receive
from their governments in terms of assessing the cost floor. Part of
the reason for the lack of the use of such a test may be that, in
practice, an SOE often incurs both advantages and disadvantages
from its state-owned status, and some of these disadvantages (e.g.,
loss of managerial control) may be difficult to quantify.
483. D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anti-Competitive Government Interventions That Benefit
Special Interests, GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
484. See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005).
485. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 518.
486. Panzar, supra note 297, at 21.
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Administrative ease is certainly an important practical concern.
Some rough rules of thumb might be proposed on these grounds.
The most appropriate rule of thumb (and rule generally) will depend
upon the relevant social objective. Is it clear what this objective
should be? If the social objective is efficiency through the use of
antitrust law, then the contours of such a test might be based on an
imputation test for SOEs.
One imprecise analogy would be to cost imputation in TELRIC
pricing in telecommunications. The cost imputation of TELRIC
pricing of the 1996 Telecom Act seems to have been
unadministrable for quite some time in the United States, New
Zealand, and other jurisdictions. However, there are also differences
between SOE cost imputation and TELRIC cost imputation.
TELRIC methodology was adopted primarily because of the issue of
selling inputs to retail competitors. This issue, and thus the TELRIC
methodology, may be less germane in many relevant settings. While
TELRIC served primarily to keep the incumbent’s (wholesale) prices
relatively low, pricing restrictions for SOEs may serve primarily to
keep the incumbent SOE’s (retail) prices relatively high.
Many antitrust systems are concerned with the potential of false
positives in prosecution.487 This is particularly a concern in predatory
pricing cases when low prices may support competition even if they
harm competitors. Compounding the issue of what might go into an
SOE predatory pricing test is the concern that courts may not be
able to handle such complexity. That is, legal rules must be
administrable. As Hovenkamp notes:
[T]here is relatively little disagreement about the basic proposition
that often our general judicial system is not competent to apply the
economic theory necessary for identifying strategic behavior as
anticompetitive. This makes the development of simple antitrust
rules critical. Antitrust decision making cannot consider every
complexity that the market presents.488

Accordingly, it is better to have an easier-to-administer test of
predation for SOEs than a complex test if the error cost for the

487. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984)
(discussing the greater harms of false positives over false negatives).
488. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 47 (2005).
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complex test would be too high.489 Administrability is particularly a
concern regarding a predatory pricing test that would treat one form
of entity differently than another and would require a complex
imputation test.
What is not clear is whether or not a separate SOE predatory
pricing test is administrable in either common law or civil law
jurisdictions. Such a test would require a sense of the costs of an
efficient entrant. To determine this cost, there would need to be a
way to determine what costs are due to the soft budget constraint of
the SOE based on its governance structure and the special privileges
that the government grants it. Based on the general concern of
administrability of predatory pricing, it is not clear that such a
specific test—if it could be devised—might be understood and
administered by courts. Antitrust case law would need to catch up to
economic thinking on SOEs and on government support for firms.
Courts across the countries surveyed have yet to be able to show an
ability to grapple with these issues effectively and seem to have some
trouble even with cost-based tests involving private firms. An
antitrust solution needs more work both at the theoretical level and
in terms of implementation within antitrust doctrine.
The purpose behind much of antitrust analysis is to determine
what an efficient competitor would do. However, in the case of
SOEs, the problem is that an efficient new entrant would never have
created the type of network that many SOEs have. European state
aids jurisprudence recognizes this point but most countries lack a
state aids regime.490
G. Final Thoughts
Overall, SOE competition and governance issues are difficult
questions. Unfortunately, the prospects for a simple, neat rule for
SOE pricing seem limited. Competition law is inadequate at present
given a lack of an effective test to measure predation by SOEs as well
as administrability problems. A larger competition policy may or may
not be inadequate—privatization is clearly not palatable and
competition advocacy to liberalize markets may be a non-starter
during the current global crisis. Public choice concerns limit
regulatory liberalization and these concerns must be overcome.
489. On error costs, see Easterbrook, supra note 487.
490. Chronopost SA v. UFEX, C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P, ¶ 38 (Dec. 6. 2007).
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Some SOEs matter more than others, particularly those in critical
network industries (e.g., transport, finance, utilities). In these areas
sector regulators have serious capture problems. Perhaps the worldwide macro-economic crisis leading to a reinvigorated IMF that
demands liberalization might be the only way to create more
competition. Better corporate governance, akin to the requirements
of corporate governance for publicly traded firms, might help. A key
role of price floors for SOEs is to limit “empire building” by SOE
managers. Perhaps empire building can be limited more effectively in
practice via internal governance reform; the ideal rules for SOE
pricing may well be sector-specific.491 These are themes worth
developing in future scholarship.

491. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, Regulation, Competition, and
Liberalization, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 325, 326 (2006) (“[T]here is no single set of directions that
can guide the challenging journey from monopoly to competition in all settings.”).
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